COMMENTS
PER CURIAM DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT: 1958 TERM
This second annual study of the per curiam decisions of the United States
Supreme Court' presents an opportunity to compare the per curiam practice
of the Court in successive terms. More important than comparative statistics,
however, is whatever knowledge of the Court's general per curiam practice
can be gleaned from the study of the 1958 Term. Under what circumstances and for what reasons does the Supreme Court resort to the per curiam
device? When are such dispositions justifiable? Of what precedent value are
the decisions so rendered? Broad questions such as these will not be answered
on the basis of two or even twenty annual studies; but it must be assumed that
a case-by-case study of the Court's more important per curiam decisions will
bring us closer to the answers.
I

The Supreme Court handed down 100 full, signed opinions and 151 per
curiam decisions in the 1958 Term. Only 96 of the per curiam cases, however,
were decided on their merits, the others being disposed of on non-substantive
grounds, e.g., certiorari denied, certiorari dismissed and orders in original
jurisdiction cases. Although fewer cases were decided by the Court in the
1958 Term than in the 1957 Term, the ratio of full opinions to substantive
per curiam decisions only increased slightly.2
The statistical charts, designed primarily to give an over-all picture of
the Court's per curiam practice, raise some points of particular interest.
In the 1958 Term, as in the 1957 Term, there appears to have been a close
correlation between those cases in which the Court heard oral argument and
those in which a written explanation accompanied the decision. Counsel,
then, who can convince the Court in the first instance that his case is important
enough to be worthy of oral argument is more likely to have the satisfaction
of explanation by the Court. There was a marked increase in the 1958 Term
in the percentage of cases in which appeal was dismissed for want of substantial
federal question. Although no generalizations are justified on the basis of
IThe first study appeared in the Winter 1959 issue of the University of Chicago Law
Review. 26 U. Cm. L. Rav. 279 (1959).
2 In addition to the 129 per curiam decisions on the merits in the 1957 Term (see Table
1) there were 109 full, signed opinions. 26 U. COa. L. REv. at 280, n. 7. Non-per curiam orders
are not included in this study.

TABLE 1
SUBJECT MATTER
PER CURLWS

PRwciPAL SuByEcr

1957

Admiralty .......................................
Armed Forces ...................................
Bill of Rights:
Freedom of Speech .............................
Self-Incrimination ..............................
Federal Civil Jurisdiction and Procedure ............
Federal Criminal Cases:
Procedure .....................................
Crim es .......................................
Federal Habeas Corpus Procedure ..................
Federal Regulation under the Commerce Clause:
Agriculture ....................................
Antitrust .....................................
Carriers .......................................
Communications ...............................
Compensation and Employer's Liability ..........
Labor ........................................
Securities .....................................
Trade Regulation ..............................
Fourteenth Amendment:
Civil Jurisdiction and Procedure .................
Criminal Procedure ............................
Freedom of Speech, Press, Assembly, Religion ....
Segregation ...................................
State Statutes .................................
O ther.........................................
Immigration and Naturalization ...................
Impairment of Contract ..........................
Land La s .......................................
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks ..................
Power of State Courts ............................
Review of Federal Administrative Agencies (not otherwise classified) .................................
State Regulation of Commerce .....................
Statutes and Treaties (not otherwise classified):
Federal .......................................
State .........................................
Taxation:
Federal .......................................
State .........................................
Tort Claims against United States .................
Total .......................................

1
2
5
3
18
2
1
3
18
2
7
4

7
3
25
1
6

9
3
1
2
6
3
3
4
1
4
5
2
3
16
5

2

2
3
1
1

7
2

3

1
2

1

3
3

4
4
1

129

96

ORIGIN OF CASES

129

2
6

2

TABLE 2

State Courts ...................
Lower Federal Courts ...........
Specialized Federal Courts .......

1958

1957

1958

52
76
1

51
45

TABLE 3
JURISDICTIONAL BASIS
1957

1958

63
66

37
59

1957

1958

19
110

14
82

Certiorari ......................
Appeal ........................
TABLE 4
ORAL ARGumENT

With ..........................
Without .......................
TABLE 5
TREATMENT OF CASES

1958

1957
Orally
Argued

Total

Orally
Argued

2
6
11

68
34
27

4
2
8

Without explanation or citation.
With citation only ............
With explanation .............

Total

56
14
26

TABLE 6
DISPOSITION

OF

CASES
1957

1958

31
7
3
29

35
6
3
16

11

5

5
31

14
11
5

Appeal Dismissed for Want of Substantial Federal Question ........
Appeal Dismissed .............................................
Judgment Affirmed by an Equally Divided Court .................
Judgment Affirmed ............................................
Judgment Vacated and Case Remanded for Reconsideration in Light
of Authority Cited ..........................................
Judgment Vacated and Case Remanded with Instructions Other than
To Reconsider in Light of Authority Cited .....................
Judgment Reversed ...........................................
Judgment Reversed and Case Remanded .........................
Judgment Reversed on Confession of Error .......................
M iscellaneous ................................................

9
4

TABLE 7
Unanimous Court ................................
Concurring Justice(s) .............................
Dissenting Justice(s) .............................
Both Concurring and Dissenting Justices ............
Equally Divided Court ...........................

73*
0
18t
2
3

* This total includes one case in which one justice was of the opinion that
Certiorari had been improvidently granted.
This total includes five cases dismissing appeals in which one or more of the
Justices was of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.
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an increase between any two terms, the fact that this was the most frequent
disposition in both the 1957 and 1958 terms adds some evidence to the suspicion
that the Court is using this disposition in appeal cases much as it uses its
power to deny certiorari. It is of further interest that 73 of the 96 per curiam
decisions were by a unanimous Court. Although it is not insignificant that there
were 23 non-unanimous per curiam decisions, there was a higher degree of
unanimity in per curiam decisions than in cases decided in signed opinions, 3
a fact which indicates that at least to some degree the Court still uses the
per curiam to decide cases in which there is little disagreement. 4 However,
it is interesting to note that in the 1958 Little Rock Case, 5 in which the Court
obviously desired to indicate strong unity, the Court shied away from the per
curiam disposition and instead resorted to the novel technique of listing each
Justice by name before the opinion. This suggests that the Court felt the per
curiam device would not sufficiently indicate unity.
Many cases decided by the Supreme Court can be effectively disposed of
in short, per curiam decisions. A great majority of the 1958 Term per curiam
decisions fall within this category. Thus, in areas of the law which are well
settled elaboration beyond the citation of key cases is unnecessary, 6 and there
are times when the Court need accompany its decision by neither citation nor
explanation.7 In still other cases the Court alters or expands existing law in
per curiam decisions and seems justified in doing so. Thus, in Hotel Employees
v. Leedom8 the Court, in ruling that the National Labor Relations Board
has no authority to refuse jurisdiction in all cases involving hotels, cited
a case which explicitly refused to rule on the hotel situation.9 The reasoning
of the cited case, however, does logically apply to Hotel and the citation makes
the decision clear. In Patterson v. United States'o the Court affirmed a lower
court decision that the exclusive remedy of a seaman for injuries incurred
on a United States merchant vessel lies under the Federal Employees Coin3Of the 100 cases decidedinfull, signed opinions in the 1958 Term the Court was unanimous
in 25.
An exception to this practice is the per curiam disposition of cases in which the Court
is equally divided. See, in the 1958 Term, Lev v. United States, 360 U.S. 470 (1959); Woody
v. United States, 359 U.S. 118 (1959); Eagle Lion Studios, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 358 U.S.
100 (1958).
5 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
6 See, e., United States v. Hine Pontiac, 360 U.S. 715 (1959); Ohio v. Dayton Power and
Light Co., 359 U.S. 552 (1959); Dyer v. SEC, 359 U.S. 499 (1959).
7 See, e.g., Lamar Bath House Co. v. City of Hot Springs, 359 U.S. 534 (1959); New
Jersey v. United States, 359 U.S. 27 (1959); Anderson v. Corporation Comm'n of Okla.,
358 U.S. 642 (1959); United States v. National M1alleable and Steel Castings Co., 358 U.S.
38 (1958).
6 358 U.S. 99 (1958).
9 Office Employees v. Labor Board, 353 U.S. 313 (1957). See id. at 320, n. 13.
"0359 U.S. 495 (1959).
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pensation Act" and not under the Suits in Admiralty Act. This decision is
consistent with that reached in Johansen v. United States 3 concerning seamen
injured on public vessels. The Johansen decision was expressly confined to
public vessel seamen but the reasoning seems equally applicable to seamen
on a merchant vessel. In Patterson the Court justifiably extended the Johansen
rule.
In some instances, however, the Court appears to use the per curiam as
a device by which it can decide a case in a controversial area of the law without
expressing an opinion. 14 DeVries v. Baurngartner'sElectric Constr. Co.'5 would appear to be such a case. "Right to Work" statutes have caused great controversy
and political debate for some years. At the same time, Supreme Court decisions
concerning federal pre-emption have received a great deal of criticism."
DeVries, involving both "Right to Work" and federal pre-emption, required
the Court either to go on record in favor of one controversial position and
against another, or to decide the case without explanation. By resorting to the
latter, the Court may have saved itself from further abuse by some of its
less'articulate, result-oriented critics. The Court has, however, by failing either
to clarify the law or to defend rationally a questionable decision, left itself
open to adverse criticism by more informed scholars of our legal system.
In other cases the per curiam disposition leaves unclear what was decided.
In NAACP v. Bennett' 7 the Court vacated a decision in which the District
Court had abstained from adjudging the validity of a state statute until it
had been construed by the state courts. In remanding the case the Court declared that "When the validity of a state statute, challenged under the United
States Constitution, is properly for adjudication ...reference to the state
court.., should not automatically be made."' To support this proposition,
however, the Court cited Harrison v. NAACP, 9 a recently decided case in
115

U.S.C. § 751 (1952).

1:46 U.S.C. § 741 (1952).

U.S. 427 (1952).
lkn the study of the 1957 Term "misuses" of the per curiam dispositon were categorized
as follows: "(1) In some instances the Court appears to use per curiams to avoid an e:.pression
of opinion on important issues. (2) Frequently the Court does not make clear what is decided.
(3) At times the law appears to be altered with little if any expressed explanation or justification." 26 U. Cm. L. REV. at 282. For comparative purposes the same general organization
will be used in the study of the 1958 Term.
11359 U.S. 498 (1959).
16See 'Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations:
I, 59 COLUMX. L. REV. 6, 26-36 (1959) for a recent discussion of the general problem of preemption in the labor field, with a list of other secondary material at n.4.
1-360 U.S. 471 (1959).
IsIbid.
19360 U.S. 167 (1959).
13343
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which the Court reversed the lower court for not waiting until the state statute
involved had been interpreted by the state courts. Although the cite to Harrison
clearly indicates that that case is to be given a somewhat restricted interpretation, the lower court is told nothing other than that it might, under some
circumstances, undefined by the Court, decide the case before it without
waiting for state judicial construction.
i 0
In Mills v. Louisiana
the Court seems to have erred in another manner.
By citing a case in which the Court expressly refused to deal with the problem
involved in Mills,21 the Court, without explanation, appears to have increased
the restrictions on an individual's right against self-incrimination. There is
no apparent justification for the Court's failure to defend this far-reaching
decision by a reasoned opinion.
It is interesting to note that some of the problems presented by per curiams
of the 1958 Term had previously been dealt with by the Court in per curiam
decisions. DeVries v. Banimgartner'sElectric Constr. Co.22 held that a state court
could not give damages for union activity which was designed to force an employer
to violate a state Right to Work statute and which also reasonably could
be an unfair labor practice. A preceding case23 decided per curiam held that
state courts could not enjoin such conduct. In Deen v. Hicknan 4 the Supreme
Court had to determine the validity of a state procedure in Federal Employer's
Liability Act25 cases, which procedure required the jury to answer special
interrogatories in addition to rendering a general verdict and which authorized
appellate courts to order new trials after weighing the evidence. The Court
had previously ruled on the special verdict point in Arnold v. Panhandle& Santa
Fe Ry2 and arguably had ruled on the new trial point in Harsh v. Illinois
TerminalR.R.2 7 Both cases were decided per curiam. If it is true that there are
certain areas of the law in which the Court decides cases per curiam-either
because the Court does not consider them important enough for more extensive
treatment, or because the Court does not want to express itself on the issues
in the area, or for any other reason-the possibility exists that a doctrine could
be developed over a period of years by a series of per curiam decisions, all but
unnoticed by the legal profession.
20360 U.S. 230 (1959).
21

Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
22 359 U.S. 498 (1959).
2
1 Local 429, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 353 U.S. 969

(1957).
24 359

U.S. 57 (1958).

2545 U.S.C. § 51 (1952).
26353 U.S. 360 (1957).
27351

Ill. App. 272, 114 N.E.2d 901 (1953), rev'd, 348 U.S. 940 (1955).
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An interesting problem is presented by the use of the per curiam disposition
in the affirmance by an equally divided court of lower court judgments. When
the Court affirms in this manner with no explanation of the views of the individual justices great doubt is cast upon the treatment which will be accorded the
issues involved when they next arise. An equally divided Court does not necessarily signify an equal division on any one issue but could result from small
but different minorities on each of several issues. Lev v. United States,28 for
example, involved four related but disparate questions. In affirming by an equally divided Court, the Court has placed the status of all four in doubt. If in
fact only one Justice favored reversal on each of the four grounds, propositions
on which the Court were in substantial agreement were needlessly opened
to question. Were opinions of the individual Justices published in these cases
it would be clear on which issues, if any, the Court was evenly divided.
II
A. "RIGHT TO WORK" AND PRE-EMPTION

In DeVries v. Baumgartner'sElectric Constr. Co0 9 the Supreme Court reversed
the South Dakota Supreme Court in a per curiam decision, citing San Diego
Unions v. Garmon,30 the key labor case decided in the 1958 Term. The situations
in both cases were similar. The defendant union in each case had engaged in
picketing for the purpose of forcing the employer to enter into a union shop
agreement although his employees had indicated no desire to join the union."'
Without prior determination by the NLRB, the state courts held in both cases
that, although they were precluded from enjoining the picketing because in all
probability it was an unfair labor practice under the Labor Management Relations Act,32 they were free to award damages under the doctrine laid down by
23360 U.2. 470 (1959).
29 359 U.S. 498 (1959).

30 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In another per curiam decision of a labor case the Supreme Court
remanded to the California courts for "modification in the light of" Garmon. Grocery Drivers
Union Local 848 v. Seven Up Bottling Co., 359 U.S. 434 (1959).
31When the Garmon case was before the Supreme Court of California that court stated
that the union demanded "that the plaintiffs enter into an agreement which would require
that all of the plaintiffs' employees be or become members of the defendant unions" although
the employees "had indicated that they do not desire to join." 49 Cal.2d 595, 598, 320 P.2d
473,475 (1958). (Emphasis added.) In theDeVrkes case finding of fact No. 13 by the trial court
reads: "It was the purpose of the defendants to tie up plaintiff's jobs, to compel the termination
of plaintiff's contracts for work and material on said jobs and to apply pressure on the plaintiff
in order to influence or make plaintiff consent to be organized or to sign a Union Contract
and exert economic pressure on the plaintiff to require its employees to join the union or to
discharge them or to hire only Union Members, as employees doing electrical work." Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, 28a.
32It is settled that activities which arguably are unfair labor practices under the national
act cannot be enjoined in the absence of violence or the threat of violence. Weberv. AnheuserBusch, 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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the Supreme Court in United Const. Workers v. Laburnum33 and Automobile
4
Workers v. Russell.1
In Garmon the Supreme Court, reversing the California Supreme Court, held
that in the absence of prior determination by the NLRB the states are precluded from awarding damages in tort actions arising out of union conduct. The
Court stated that damages could not be given for activity which might reasonably be either protected or prohibited activity under the LMRA; it also indicated grave doubt as to whether the states could award damages for non-violent
activity affecting commerce in the area which is neither protected nor prohibited
by the LAMRA.35 Four members of the Court (all of whom dissented in DeVries)
concurred on the ground that the concerted activity before the Court was arguably protected by the LMRA, but they vigorously dissented from the Court's
foreclosure of state power over prohibited activity."
Garmon would appear to control DeVries but for the fact that DeVries arose
under the South Dakota "Right to Work" statuteA7 This fact posed important
issues not before the Court in Garmon and makes the per curiam reversal worthy
of comment.
It is important to differentiate among three peaceful picketing situations:
(1) those involving Right to Work but no pre-emption queston; (2) those involv19
33 347 U.S. 656 ( 54).,In Laburnum the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment by a state
court awarding the plaintiff company damages against the defendant union in a tort action.
By threatening violence the union had forced the company to close down. The Court held
that although the union activity was probably an unfair labor practice, the state court still
had jurisdiction to award damages in a tort action, for no similar remedy was available
under the LMIRA.
34356 U.S. 634 (1958). In Russell the Supreme Court upheld a judgment of a state court
awarding compensatory damages to a non-union employee who had been kept from his job
by the mass picketing of the defendant union. The Court recognized that the union conduct
was probably an unfair labor practice and assumed that the NLRB could validly award lost
pay to the plaintiff. Garmon limits both Laburnum and Russell to situations of violence or
near violence. For a comprehensive discussion of the Russell and Laburnum cases see Meltzer,

The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdktion over Labor Relations: I, 59 CoLtm. L.

REv. 6, 26-36 (1959).
5 "If the Board decides, subject to appropriate federal judicial review, that conduct
is protected by § 7, or prohibited by § 8, then the matter is at an end, and the States are
ousted of all jurisdiction. Or, the Board may decide that an activity is neither protected nor
prohibited, and thereby raise the question whether such activity may be regulated by the
States." 359 U.S. at 245.
36The four concurring justices urged that if the uiion conduct was clearly unprotected
by the LMIRA the state's award of damages should be affirmed on the authority of United
Constr. Workers v. Laburnum and Automobile Workers v. Russell. See notes 5 and 6 supra.
These Justices could, moreover, see no reason for doubting the principle of the Briggs-Stratton
case, Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949), that the states had power
to act in those areas neither protected nor prohibited by the LMRA. Id. at 250, 253. For a more

extensive discussion of the Garmon case, see Wellington, Labor and the Federal System, 26 U.

Cm. L. REv. 542, 552-556 (1959).
37 S.D. CoDE ch. 17.11 (Supp. 1952). The Right to Work policy has been written into
section 2 of article 6 of the South Dakota Constitution.
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ing pre-emption but no Right to Work; and (3) those involving both a Right
to Work statute38 and the problem of federal pre-emption. In five cases in which
the pre-emption issue was not raised the Supreme Court has upheld the power
of state courts to enjoin picketing, the purpose of which was illegal under state
law. In four of these cases the purpose of the picketing has been to force employers to enter into a union shop agreement violative of the states' Right to
Work statutes. 39 In these cases the Court rejected the unions' contention based
on Thornhill v. Alabama,40 that the injunctions violated their constitutional
right of free speech.
In those cases where pre-emption is raised and no Right to Work issue is
involved, it is highly doubtful whether the states have any power to enjoin
illegal purpose picketing. The Court has not expressly overruled Automobile
Workers v. Wisconsin Board4' which upheld state power to enjoin activity neither protected nor prohibited by the LMRA. This view was, however, expressly
questioned in the majority opinion of Garmon,42 and in the 1957 Term the
Court refused to apply Briggs-Strattonin a case where the concerted activity
involved-the refusal to cross the picket lines of a struck shipper-appeared to
43
be neither protected nor prohibited by the national act.
39 Typical legislation designated as Right to Work statutes provide that union membership,
or correspondingly, non-membership, shall not be a condition of employment. These statutes
prohibit either all or some forms of union security agreements and provide criminal penalties
for employers who violate the law. Although picketing designed to force an employer to enter
into an illegal union security agreement does not violate a Right to Work statute aimed solely
at employers, state courts have held such picketing tortious by reasoning that it is for the
"illegal purpose" of coercing an employer to violate the Right to Work law. E.g., Construction
and Gen. Labor Union, Local 688 v. Stephenson, 225 S.W.2d 958 (Tex. 1950); cf. Pappas
v. Stacey, 151 Me. 36, 42, 116 A.2d 497, 500 (1955). Such picketing will be referred to as
"anti-Right to Work" picketing in this Comment.
39 International Brotherhood v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Plumbers Union v. Graham,
245 U.S. 192 (1952); Building Service Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); Teamsters Union
v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950). In Gibony v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949), the
fifth case, the picketing was aimed at forcing a wholesale distributor to enter into an exclusive
dealing agreement which would have violated state law as an illegal restraint of trade.
40310 U.S. 88 (1940).
41336 U.S. 245 (1949) (the Briggs-Stratton case). In 1958 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania relied on the authority of Briggs-Strattonin a case in which it upheld an injunction
against "secondary picketing," the picketing of an employer unconnected with the labor disputeto force him to bring pressure on the employer with whom the union is having the dispute.
This kind of picketing was contrary to state law. Bonwit Teller & Co. of Phila. v. District
65, 393 Pa. 324, 142 A.2d 193 (1958).
42 The treatment of Briggs-Stratton in Garvwn is not surprising in view of the emphasis
placed on the NLRB's exclusive responsibility for determining the status of union activity
in the Garnon decision.
43 Aladdin Industries v. Associated Transport, 355 U.S. 8 (1957), which was remanded
for consideration in light of Kerrigan Iron Workers v. Cook Truck Lines, 353 U.S. 968 (1956);
noted in Per Curiam Decisions of the Supreme Court: 1957 Term, 26 U. CHr. L. REv. 279,
288 (1959). See Meltzer, op. cit. supra note 34, for a recent discussion of the general problem
of pre-emption in the labor field, with a list of other secondary material at n.4. See Meltzer,
op. cit. supra note 34, at n.18, for citations to the legislative history relevant to the general
pre-emption problem and to secondary sources discussing the problem.
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Cases involving both the pre-emption and the Right to Work issues present
a unique problem. In the general pre-emption area the Supreme Court developed doctrine without the clear-cut guidance of Congress, but Congress in section 14(b) of the LATRA, 44 unquestionably confirmed state authority to enact
Right to Work statutes, and the legislative history of that section reflected an
awareness and consideration of the problems of federalism. The corollary of
such statutes appears to be the power of enforcement including the power to
enjoin activity aimed at securing agreements which would violate the state
4
statutes permitted by Congress. 1
Recognition by state courts of the distinctive problem of federal-state jurisdiction in the Right to Work area is striking in comparison to the neglect of
this problem by the Supreme Court. In the first case in which exclusive federal
jurisdiction was raised as a defense in a state suit to enjoin anti-Right to Work46
picketing, the Supreme Court of North Dakota upheld the state injunction.
Invoking section 14(b) to demonstrate that the pre-emption in the Right to
Work area was unique, the Court declared that the picketing involved could
not be considered an unfair labor practice because "the unfair practices prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act involved conduct carried on for the purpose of
preventing some objective protected by that act" while the Right to Work
' 47
statute was "in a field excepted from the Taft-Hartley Act.
In the 1956 Term the Supreme Court, in Local Union 429 v. Farnsworth
Chambers,41 reversed the Supreme Court of Tennessee, which had upheld an
injunction against picketing to compel an employer to enter into a union shop
agreement in violation of the state Right to Work statute. The Court delivered
44"Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of
agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment
in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or
Territorial Law." Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 14(b), 61 Stat.
151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1952).
4 This was the basic contention of the North Carolina Supreme Court in Douglas Aircraft
Co. v. Local Union 379, 247 N.C. 620, 101 S.E.2d 800 (1958).
-"Minor v. Building & Construction Trades Council, 75 N.W.2d 139 (N.D. 1956). There
havebeen many cases in the state courts involving power to enjoin picketing violative of Right
to Work policy in which the pre-emption issue was not raised. E.g., Baldwin v. Arizona
Flame Restaurant, 82 Ariz. 385, 313 P.2d 759 (1957); Woodard v. Collier, 210 Ga. 239, 78
S.E.2d 526 (1953); Miami Typographical Union No. 430 v. Ormerod, 22 CCH Lab. Cas.
82,700 (1952); Self v. Taylor, 217 Ark. 953, 235 S.W.2d 45 (1951); Local Union No. 519
v. Robertson, 44 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1950). The fact that the defendant unions did not raise the
pre-emption issue as a defense in those cases prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Guss v. Utah
Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957), is probably explicable on the grounds that they
did not forecast the Cuss decision and believed that the state courts had jurisdiction to grant
in'unctions because the industries involved did not meet the NLRB's jurisdictional standards
The fact that pre-emption was not raised in some cases decided after Guss, e.g. Arizona
Flame, is some indication that counsel believed that Right to Work disputes fell outside the
u-ual pre-emption rules. (But note that Arizona Flame was decided after Local Union 429
v. Farsnworth & Chambers, 353 U.S. 969 (1957), discussed in text at note 48 infra.)
4775 N.W.2d at 151.
48353 U.S. 969 (1957).
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a one sentence per curiam opinion consisting only of citations to Weber v. Anheuser-Busch49 and Garner v. Teamsters." Although Weber and Garner are important pre-emption cases, neither case involved the Right to Work issue; nor
did either indicate how anti-Right to Work activity should be treated in light
of section 14(b).51

State reaction to Farnsworthwas confused and varied. In 1958 the North
Carolina Supreme Court recognized the binding effect of Farnsworthand held
that anti-Right to Work picketing was not enjoinable. 2 But early in 1959 the
Supreme Court of Alabama upheld an injunction against similar picketing
without mentioning Farnsworthin its discussion of the effect of section 14(b)
53
on state power.
The two most interesting post-Farnsworthcases came out of Kansas and Tennessee. In October, 1957, the Supreme Court of Kansas decided Asphalt Paving
v. InternationalBrotherlwod. 4 At issue was state jurisdiction to enjoin picketing
at a construction site for the purpose of compelling a subcontractor who employed non-union labor to enter into a union shop agreement. The court held
that the union had violated both the state Right to Work statute and the state
secondary boycott law. But the court also held that the activity was an unfair
labor practice under section 8(b) (4) (A) of the LMRA and that state power was
foreclosed by Supreme Court decisions including Farnsworth. A concurring
opinion urged the Supreme Court to give some rationale for its pre-emption
rule in the Right to Work field,es expressed grave doubts as to the correctness
of the Farnsworthdecision in light of 14(b) and concluded with the following:
The light of state jurisdiction, illuminated by § 14(b), has been dimmed and states
may no longer look to that section as a federal authorization to enjoin conduct directed
toward the execution of union security agreements in violation of their laws, which
conduct is definable as an unfair labor practice under section 8. It is in the semi-darkness of these precedents that I affirm the judgment of the district court.
49348 U.S. 468 (1955).

5 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
51 For a more extended discussion of the Weber and Garner cases see Meltzer, op. cit.
supra note 34, at 15-19.
52
Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Local 379, 247 N.C. 620, 101 S.E.2d 800 (1958).
5
3 Alabama Highway Express v. Local 612, 108 So. 2d 350 (Ala. 1959). A second and
independent ground for the ruling was that independent contractors and not "employees"
as defined in section 2(3) of the LMRA were involved in the dispute.
54181 Kan. 775, 317 P.2d 349 (1957).
55"I agreeably accept decisions of the Supreme Court manifesting an obvious purpose
of securing uniformity in the administration of national labor relations, but I should prefer
to understand the rationale of the Supreme Court's limitation of § 14(b). Without this understanding, it is a burdensome task thrust upon a judge of a state court by the supremacy clause
to apply the laws of the United States in matters relating to the adjustment of federal-state
relations." 181 Kan. 775, 792, 317 P.2d 349, 362 (1957).
51181 Kan. 775, 798, 317 P.2d 349, 366 (1957).
1
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Two months after Asphalt was decided, a chancery court of Tennessee, the
state where Farnsworthoriginated, held in Pruitt v. Lamber 7 that the state
courts had jurisdiction to enjoin picketing violative of Right to Work policy.
It decided that, in spite of the language of the Tennessee Supreme Court,"
there had been no Right to Work issue in the Farnsworthcase. The court urged
that the union in Farnsworthhad only requested that the employer hire union
labor, and that this request did not contravene the Right to Work law. As to
the Supreme Court's opinion in Farnsworth,the court stated:
Possibly, the Supreme Court of the United States in the Farnsworth& Chambers case
recognized that the peaceful picketing of the complainant company-admittedly engaged in interstate commerce-was not a violation of the Tennessee Right-to-Work
Act, and reversed the case for that reason.-9
The court defended this strained interpretation of Farnsworthby stating that
it could not "conceive that the Supreme Court of the United States makes such
an anomalous and unrealistic construction of section 14(b) of the LMRA, and
[it dial not consider ... that the Court has.""0

DeVries v. Baumgartner'sElectric Constr. Co. 6' gave the Supreme Court an
opportunity to clarify pre-emption law in the Right to Work area by making
explicit its rationale for the Farnsworthdecision. Its exclusive reliance on San
Diego Unions v. Garmond2 failed to do so. Garmon declared that concerted activity which could not be enjoined could not be the basis for damages in tort.
Accordingly, Garmon applies to DeVries only if the picketing in that case was
not enjoinable. In other words, Garmon applies to DeVries only if Farnsworth
is binding law in the Right to Work area. This is the precise question which has
produced so much disagreement in the state courts.

In support of its decisions in Farnsworth and DeVries the Supreme Court
might have referred to an earlier pre-emption decision relating to problems of
union security. In Plankingtonv. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,6" the
Court, in a per curiam decision, struck down an order of the state board requiring an employer to reinstate an employee who had been dismissed for failure
to comply with a union security agreement which violated both the state act
and the LMRA. Subsequent explanation of Plankinglon by the Court0 4 indicates the import of that decision is that the states are without power to grant
6741

L.R.R.M. 2369 (1957).
69 "The demurrers filed to the original and supplemental bill raises [sic] one issue, that is,
whether the Courts of Tennessee have thepower to enforce theright to work law.., or whether
it was the intention of Congress in the enactment of the Labor Management Act... to so
exclusively pre-empt the field of Labor Management Relations in inter-state commerce as to
remove the matter from the jurisdiction of the state courts." 299 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tenn. 1951).
59
41 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2378(1957).
61359 U.S. 498 (1959).
60
Id.at 2379.
62359 U.S. 236 (1959).
63338 U.S. 953 (1950), reversing255 Wis. 285, 38 N.W.2d 688 (1949).
6
4Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 340 U.S. 383, 390 n.12 (1951).
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affirmative relief from union security provisions which violate state law if the
relief overlaps with remedies prescribed by the LMRA.65 If the states, according to Plankington, are precluded from remedying conduct directly violative of
their Right to Work laws and caused by union security agreements contravening those laws, it would appear to follow that they would also be precluded from
granting relief against union conduct aimed at securing such agreements where
the LMRA also prohibited such conduct.
The difficulty with this approach is that, in effect, it writes section 14(b) out
of the LMRA. The legislative history of that section indicates that Congress
did not intend to delegate to the states the power to regulate union security
arrangements on the one hand, and, on the other, to deprive them of the means
of enforcement. 6 As section 14(b) appears to be one area in which Congress
was concerned with problems of federalism it seems likely that they considered
concurrent federal-state jurisdiction would result with respect to union
67
security.
If it could be believed that Farnsworthand DeVries have settled the preemption problems in the Right to Work field, it might be argued that the fact
that the law is settled more than compensates for any rational doubts as to the
wisdom of the decisions. But the most unfortunate aspect of the two cases is
that the lack of well-reasoned opinions makes it impossible to conclude that the
questions of law have been settled. When in deciding Farnsworththe Supreme
Court cited two cases which were unrelated to the unique problem involved
and made no mention of either Right to Work or section 14(b), the precedent
of that decision was impaired. It has been both ignored and distinguished away.
DeVries, with its citation of another non-Right to Work case, Garmon, is likely
to receive the same treatment. When DeVries was before the Supreme Court of
South Dakota it was decided on general pre-emption grounds with no mention
made of any special problems arising from the Right to Work statute. 6 Counsel for both sides before the United States Supreme Court agreed that the case
was controlled by Laburnum and Russell, but disagreed in the interpretation of
those cases. Both sides urged, moreover, that Garmon, not yet decided, presented substantially the same questions.69 There is at least some reason to doubt,
65Meltzer, op. cit. supra note 34, at 42.
6 Id.
67

at 41, n.127 for a collection of the relevant legislative history.
b4.

6

8 Indeed, although the court made no reference to Farnsworth,it accepted the proposition
that Weber v. Anlheuser-Buwclh applied to the situation before it, and therefore denied the plain
tiff injunctive relief. As we have seen, once this assumption is made the DeVries decision
follows without question.
69Only the last two paragraphs of the Construction Co.'s brief mentioned the possibility
that section 14(b) might raise some special pre-emption questions. Mter quoting that section,
counsel concluded: "This specifically reserved to the states this portion of the field. Since
the right to enact such laws was recognized by Taft-Hartley, the right to enjoy the benefits
of such laws is not to be taken away by rendering them sterile so that no rights flow from
them." Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 11.
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therefore, whether the Supreme Court even considered the unique pre-emption
problems involved in the Right to Work area. As long as this doubt exists-as
long as it is possible that in a later case, with the issues more clearly presented
to the Court, Farnsworth and DeVries might be overruled or distinguishedthese cases will fail to settle the law of pre-emption in the Right to Work area.
III
B. APPELATE REvIEW OF NEW TRIAL MOTIONS IN STATE FELA CASES

In Deeis v. Hickma=70 the Supreme Court made its second per curiam disposition of a case arising in the Texas state courts under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act. 7' The plaintiff, a coppersmith working in a roundhouse of the
defendant Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co., had his leg broken when it
was hit by babbitt falling from a melting pot. The jury answered special interrogatories 2 and rendered a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The judgment on the verdict was reversed on appeal and judgment entered for the defendant railroad,73 but the United States Supreme Court, in the first per curiam
decision, reversed the appellate court, holding that there was sufficient proof
of employer's negligence to sustain the jury's verdict for plaintiff.7 4 On remand
the Texas Court of Civil Appeals decided that further consideration of the
negligence issue was precluded by the Supreme Court's decision and affirmed
the jury verdict on condition of a remittur by the plaintiff. 5 The Texas Supreme
Court then ordered the Court of Civil Appeals either to affirm the verdict as
rendered by the jury, or to order a new trial if it felt that the verdict was against
the weight of the evidence.76 However, the United States Supreme Court, in its
70358 U.S. 57 (1958).
7135 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended 45 U.S.C. § 51 e seq. (1957).
7

2Among the special interrogatories were the following: "Do you find from a preponderance
of the evidence that the Defendant failed to furnish one or more additional men to Plaintiff,
other than Snow, to assist Plaintiff in removing thebabbitt from the melting pot at the time and
on the occasion in question?" Answer: "No." "Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiff Deen was negligent in failing to [ob]tain additional help to do the
work he was doing at the time he received his injuries?" Answer: "Yes." Record from the District Court of Brown County, State of Texas, as printed in Petition for Certiorari filed June
25, 1956 with the United States Supreme Court. Plaintiff had attempted to remove the babbitt
with the help of only one other man. Evidence was presented to the effect that the job could
be safely done by four or five men, and no other method to do the job was provided by the
defendant railroad. Considering the jury's answers to the above interrogatories it is difficult
to see how the verdict for plaintiff could be justified. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals considered this factor, along with the insubstantial evidence when it reversed the trial court. The
fact that the Supreme Court ignored this aspect of the case is not too surprising in light
of its per curiam opinion in Arnold v. Panhandle & S.F. Ry., 353 U.S. 360 (1957), in which
it demanded affirmance of a verdict for the plaintiff in spite of the fact that every special
interrogatory was answered in favor of the defendant.
7
3 Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Deen, 275 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
7

4 Deen v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry., 353 U.S. 925 (1957).

75

Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Deen, 306 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
6 Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Deen, 312 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. 1958).

7
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second per curiam decision, held that the determination of the new trial issue
77
was "foreclosed" by its earlier opinion.
In recent years the Supreme Court has been highly sensitive to the danger of
plaintiffs being deprived of their substantive rights under the FELA by state
court procedure,78 and on one occasion it stated that the state courts fail to
realize the special nature of FFLA actions.79 Thus, the Supreme Court has
established the rule that judicial interference with the jury function by means
of directed verdicts 0 and judgments notwithstanding the verdict8 ' will seldom
be tolerated. Similarly, appellate courts are not allowed to achieve by reversal
what the trial courts cannot accomplish in the first instance.8 2 "Only when there
is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached does
a reversible error appear."8 3 It is only natural, then, that the Court should be
concerned with the state practice of ordering new trials.8 4 Although to a lesser
degree, it is clear that this practice, like those mentioned above, can deprive a
plaintiff of the benefits of a favorable jury verdict.
77
Deen v. Hickman, 358 U.S. 57 (1958). The Court said that "[t]he determination of [the
new trial] issue was foreclosed by Deen v. Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe R. Co. supra."
78 "The federal right cannot be defeated by the forms of local practice." Brown v. Western
Ry. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 296 (1949). Areas in which local practices must conform to
federal practice include: burden of proof as to contributory negligence, Central Vermont Ry.
v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915); presumptions involving burden of proof, New Orleans &
N.E.R.R. v. Harris, 247 U.S. 367 (1918); allocation of factual issues between judge and jury,
Dicev. Akron, C. &Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952); conflict betweengeneral and special verdicts,
Arnold v. Panhandle & S.F. Ry., 353 U.S. 360 (1957). Hill, Substance and Procedurein State
FELA Actions-The Converse of the Brie Problem?, 17 Omo ST. LJ. 384 (1956), concludes
that the Court is applying an outcome determinative rule in FELA cases, much as federal
courts are supposed to do as to state procedure when following the Erie doctrine in diversity
cases. The author also concludes that states are required to hold federal type jury trials. Professor Hart, in The Relations Between State and FederalLaw, 54 CoLum. L. Rv. 489 (1954),
decries the reasoning of the Court which has argued from possible differences in result because
of different procedure to a rule which seeks to eliminate these different procedures. While
this criticism may be valid, it is not the purpose of this comment to attempt to show the
correctness of the criticism. For the consideration of the present cases, rather, it accepts
the apparent trend of the Court's opinions.
79State courts fail to "take into account the special features of this statutory negligence
action that make it significantly different from the ordinary common law negligence action.
... " Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 509-10 (1957).
8o Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1949).
81 Myers v. Reading Co., 331 U.S. 477 (1947).
82 Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946).
83
Id. at 653. The Supreme Court has gone to great lengths to insure that its concept
of the evidence sufficient to require submission of the case to the jury or to sustain a jury
verdict in FELA cases be applied in the lower courts. See Appendix B to Justice Frankfurter's
dissent in Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 524 (1957).
84 This comment deals only with the power of appellate courts to order a new trial where
it is alleged the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. It does not deal with this power
when other errors such as admission of improper evidence or the making of inflammatory remarks is alleged. This comment does not deal with the closely analogous questions of the power
of the trial court to order a new trial or of the power of appellate courts to review a trial
court order for a new trial.
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Previous to Deen v. Hickman the Supreme Court had reversed a state order
for new trial in an FELA case only once, and because of the strange state procedure involved in that case it is not clear that the Court faced the issue even
then. In Harsh v. Illinois Terminal R.R. s5 the Court, after the Illinois Supreme
Court denied plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal, reversed the Illinois Appellate Court which had reversed a judgment entered upon a verdict for the plaintiff. In a two sentence per curiam opinion the Court rested solely on the authority of Lavender v. Kurn,"' a case involving a reversal of a judgment without a
remand for a new trial. The Supreme Court did not discuss the contention,
vigorously pressed by counsel for the railroad, that, unlike directed verdicts,
judgments n.o.v. and reversals by appellate courts, the grant of a new trial did
not deny the employee's right to a jury trial.8 7 After the appellate court reversed the judgment on the verdict and remanded for a new trial, the plaintiff,
desiring an immediate appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, invoked an Illinois
procedural rule s under which he waived the new trial and accepted instead an
adverse judgment. It is quite possible, then, in view of the fact that there was
a final judgment against the plaintiff at the time the Supreme Court heard the
case and further, that the Court cited a case not involving the new trial issue
as authority, that the Court viewed Harsh as a case in which the judgment on
the verdict was reversed, with no new trial issue involved. 89
86351 Ill. App. 272, 114 N.E.2d 901 (1953), rev'd, 348 U.S. 940 (1955).
6"Judgment reversed. Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645," 348 U.S. 940 (1955). TheLavender
case, as decided by the Supreme Court, did involve only a reversal without remand. However,
subsequent to this decision the Missouri Supreme Court ordered a new trial on the ground
that some evidence was improperly admitted, Lavender v. Kurn, 355 Mo. 168, 195 S.W.2d
460 (1946). The United States Supreme Court denied a motion to issue a writ of mandamus
to the Missouri court, the petitioner arguing that the Court's earlier decision required a
reinstatement of the jury verdict, Lavender v. Clark, 329 U.S. 674 (1946), and certiorari was
denied for lack of a final judgment, 329 U.S. 762 (1946). The Supreme Court in the Lavender
case did, however, lay down a general rule as to the reviewing power of appellate courts that
could beread as applying to the ordering of a new trial as well as a pure reversal. "But where,
as here, there is an evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict, the jury is free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion. And the appellate court's function
is exhausted when that evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being immaterial that the court
might draw a contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more reasonable." Lavender
v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946). The action of the Supreme Court in Deen v. Gulf, C.
& S.F. Ry., 79 S. Ct. 725 (1959), would indicate that this language cannot b e taken completely
at its face value because the Court refused to disturb the remittitur ordered by the Texas
Civil Appeals Court.
s7Respondent's Brief on Merits, pp. 28-38, Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, pp.
15-16, Harsh v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 348 U.S. 940 (1955).
8SIL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 75(2)(c) (1953).
s9 The Illinois Supreme Court in Bowman v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 11 Ill.2d 186, 142
N.E.2d 104 (1957), which arose upon procedural facts parallel to those in Harsh, followed
what it thought was the implication of Harsh. It reinstated a judgment based upon a jury
verdict, reasoning that "contrary to the determination of the Appellate Court the scope of
review of ajury verdict in a [FELA] caseis governed by Federal law andislimited to determining whether there is an evidentiary basis for the jury verdict .... " Id. at 215, 122 (Per curiam
8
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Deen v. Hickman is of interest, then, because it is the first case in which the
Supreme Court necessarily determined the power of state appellate courts to
order new trials in FELA actions. Not only is the Texas procedure not open
to the same ambiguity as was the Illinois procedure in Harsh,but Deen reached
the Supreme Court in such a way as to preclude the possibility that the Court's
decision rested on nothing more than an independent survey of the evidence and
a finding that the verdict was not contrary to the evidence. In Deen the Court
relied exclusively upon their findings in the first decision of the case, which
dealt with the appellate court's reversal." Thus the Court found that its determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to go to the jury was enough to
foreclose a new trial, and it did not make a separate finding upon the new trial
issue.
The most likely interpretation of Deen v. Hickman is that the Supreme Court
meant to restrict the review power of state appellate courts to determining
merely whether there was enough evidence upon which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. In its first review of the Deen case the directed verdict
issue was the only matter decided by the Supreme Court because that was the
only issue before the Court.9 In the second per curiam decision the Court stated
that its earlier decision precluded the Texas courts from examining the verdict
from a new trial standard.2 An obvious inference, then, is that the directed
verdict review is the only review open to the appellate courts. The major difficulty with accepting the view that the appellate courts are restricted to applying a directed verdict standard when reviewing evidence is that it ignores the
traditional right of appellate courts to review the rulings of trial courts on new
trial motions.
An alternative interpretation of Deen, although not one clearly indicated by
the Court's reliance on its first decision on the case, is that the Court felt that
the state court was applying an improper test in reviewing the new trial motion.
The Harsh case is also open to this interpretation and in both Harsh and Deen
the standard involved was one of reviewing the weight of the evidence.93 While
decision on reargument.) Thus the state supreme court felt constrained to hold that state
appellate courts in FELA cases have no power to order new trials if there is enough evidence
to preclude a directed verdict.
90 See note 77 supra.
"An appeal from the denial of a new trial was before the Texas Court of Civil Appeals when
it rendered the judgment n.o.v., but they said it did not have to reach the new trial issue
because of its decision. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Deen, 275 S.W.2d 529, 536 (Tex. Civ. App.
1955). The Supreme Court, in its reversal of the decision, merely remanded the case and did
not, as it did in Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957), indicate that it was
deciding all issues raised before the lower court but not decided by it.
92 1bid.
93Harsh v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 351 Ill. App. 272, 279, 114 N.E.2d 901 (1953); Gulf,
C. & S.F. Ry. v. Deen, 312 S.W.2d 933, 939 (1958).
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such a standard may be permissible in the usual state trial, depending upon the
particular constitution and procedure of each state, because of the peculiar
nature of the FELA suit, the Supreme Court may be requiring a different
standard in actions under this federal statute. As the Harshand Deen cases do
not indicate what, if any, standard should be used in reviewing motions for new
trial, the state courts must determine what this standard is without such guides.
In the search for the appropriate test to be used in FELA cases, the state
courts must be mindful of the Supreme Court's expression that uniformity of
application of the FELA in state and federal courts is necessary.9 4 In view of
the Court's insistence that the parties have the fullest benefit of a jury trial 5
the aforementioned uniformity must extend to the various means by which
judges control jury verdicts. Of these controls the power to order a new trial
is prominent. The FELA does not establish the extent to which this control
may be exercised by trial or appellate courts, and the Supreme Court has not
yet articulated a standard which would give guidance to state courts dealing
with federally created rights as to what forms of jury control are consistent
with the federal right and which are not. As a consequence the state courts
must seek elsewhere for a guide as to the permissible control over the jury which
the courts may exercise. While the Court has not held that state courts must
grant a federal type of jury trials it would seem reasonable that if the state
courts restrict themselves to those controls exercised by the federal courts, at
least until the Court establishes a rule for FELA cases, they can exercise such
controls without fear of being reversed by the Supreme Court for infringing
upon the right to a jury trial granted by the statute.
The right to a jury trial in the federal courts derives, of course, from the
seventh amendment. This same amendment also circumscribes review of jury
verdicts by the courts.97 To find an indication of the allowable review, therefore,
reference must be made to the English practice at the time of the adoption of
the amendment. This practice contemplated that trial courts, in cases at law,
review jury findings of fact and set aside verdicts and order new trials where
94 "Should this Court fail to protect federally created rights from dismissal because of
over-exacting local requirements for meticulous pleadings, desirable uniformity in adjudication
of federally created rights could not be achieved." Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 338
U.S. 294, 299 (1949). "Only by a uniform federal rule as to the necessary amount of evidence
may litigants under the federal act receive similar treatment in all states." Brady v. Southern
Ry., 320 U.S. 476, 479 (1943).
95See Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 509 (1957).
94
Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916), held that the seventh
amendment did not apply to state courts even when enforcing federally created rights.
However, Hill, op. cit. supra note 78, at 393, concludes that the tendency of recent decisions
is to compel states to conduct jury trials substantially similar to the manner in which they are
conducted in the federal courts. Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525

(1958).
97

"[N]o fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the Common Law."
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the verdict was unreasonable or unjust in the particular case.98 This was not
regarded as an invasion of the jury function but only as a common sense limitation upon a power that could be abused.99 The practice in the federal trial
courts has consistently involved the use of the new trial for the same purposeto avoid injustice in jury verdicts. 100
The appellate courts in the federal system are usually said not to have the
power to weigh factual issues in reviewing the grant or denial of a new trial
because of the prohibition of the seventh amendment. 0' However, the Constitution does not preclude completely all appellate review because of the nature
of the new trial motion at the trial level. A motion for a new trial is addressed
to the discretion of the trial court. Thus the only possible review by the appellate court is of the exercise of the judicial discretion. Since the exercise of this
discretion is considered a legal rather than a factual matter,0 2 review of the
trial court's action does not violate the constitutional prescription of review of
the facts.
Stated as a general rule then, federal appellate courts are said to have the
power to review the exercise of judicial discretion in the trial court's treatment
of the new trial motion.' Before such a standard can unhesitatingly be applied
to FELA cases, however, it must be determined whether the special nature of
the FELA suit required a different standard. That such might be the case is
suggested by certain language in Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R.14 This case
indicated that the remedial nature of the FELA is such that any case arising
under that act is significantly different from an ordinary common law negligence action. It is possible that the actions of the Supreme Court in Harsh and
Deen were intended to show that the restriction upon appellate review of the
new trial motion is one of the instances in which an FELA action is significantly different from an ordinary negligence action, both in the state and federal
courts. This possibility is weakened, however, by the fact that in Neese v.
Southern Ry., 1 1 an FELA case prosecuted in the federal courts, the Supreme
Court reversed a Court of Appeals order awarding a new trial without indicat98 See 6 MooRE,

EDERAL PRACTICE,

59.05 [1] (2d ed. 1953).

09Ibid.
00
1 See FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a). See also Judge Parker in Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Yeatts,
122 F.2d 350, 353, 354 (4th Cir. 1941).
101 See 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 59.08 [5], [6] (2d ed. 1953).
102 Id. at 59.08 [6].
10 3

MooRE,

op. cit. supra note 102.

104 352 U.S. 500, 509, 510 (1957).

'0-350 U.S. 77 (1955). McBride v. Toledo Terminal R.R., 354 U.S. 517 (1957), would
indicate that there is no special rule in FELA cases for the ordering of a new trial by trial
courts. In this case the trial court had given judgment n.o.v. and awarded a new trial in the
alternative. The Supreme Court did not allow the judgment n.o.v. to stand but did not disturb
the alternative new trial order.
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ing in any way that FELA cases require a different standard than do other
negligence cases.
Although the state courts in Harsh and Deen phrased the standard for reviewing the denial of the new trial motion in terms of the weight of the evidence
it seems clear that the courts were not, in fact, stating the applicable standard
of review but rather the grounds upon which the trial court should have ordered a new trial. The authority of the intermediate appellate courts in Illinois
and Texas to order a new trial is established by statute in the former and by the
constitution in the latter. In each, the intermediate appellate court is given
the same authority as the trial court, which in the present circumstances
extends to the ordering of a new trial whenever the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence.' M However, the declarations of many courts in both
states make it clear that the intermediate appellate courts do not reverse the
trial court's ruling on the new trial motion unless the trial court abused its discretion in the disposition of the matter.107
The "weight of the evidence" phrase becomes involved because it is in these
terms that the trial court is requested to order a new trial. The use of this same
phrase by the appellate courts in reviewing such a motion does not mean that
the court is exercising the same privilege as the trial court in reviewing the
weight of the evidence; rather it is merely reviewing the trial court's disposition
of a motion seeking the overturning of a verdict allegedly against the weight of
the evidence.
Even if the state courts actually were making an independent testing of the
evidence, the proper correction is not to deny completely to these courts the
right to review the denial of a new trial, but merely to indicate the proper
standard for such a review. For the sake of uniformity in the application of the
statute in state and federal courts it would seem reasonable to insist that jury
10

6In Illinois the powers of the appellate court are set out in ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110,

§ 92 (1) (1957): "In all appeals the reviewing court may... (e) Give any judgment and make
any order which ought to have been given or made... ."§ 92 (3)(b) :"Error of fact, in that the
judgment, decree or order appealed from is not sustained by the evidence or is against the
weight of the evidence, may be brought up for eview in any civil case .... " The reviewing power of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals is established by TxxAs CONST., art. 5,
§6. "[IThe decision of said courts shall be conclusive on all questions of fact brought before
them on appeal or error." This provision was interpreted by the Texas Supreme Court in
Deen to give to the Court of Civil Appeals the same power that the trial court has to weigh
the evidence and order a new trial. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Deen, 312 S.W.2d 933, 937 (Tex.

1958).
10

7Loucks v. Pierce, 341 Ill. App. 253, 93 N.E.2d 372 (1950); Hulke v. International
Mlfg. Co., 14 Ill. App. 2d 5, 142 N.E.2d 717, 739 (1957). See also cases cited in IL.
STAT. ANN. ch. 110 § 92, n. 48 (Smith-Hurd, 1956). Korentze v. Tucker, 103 S.W.2d
828, 829 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937): "Since the determination of a motion for a new trial is largely
within the discretion of the trial court, every presumption must be indulged in favor of the
ruling on the motion. To be subject to revision it must appear that the ruling is manifestly
wrong. [Citation]. It must appear that there has been an abuse of discretion." Accord: Wilson
v. Therrell, 304 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Ulmer v. El Paso, 115 S.W.2d 1151 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1938).
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verdicts in both systems be tested by the same standard. Such a result is
achieved by permitting such review according to the abuse of discretion rule.
To go further is either to place upon state courts a more limited review than
the federal courts, or to require that the two systems adopt a more restrictive
rule than exists in any other type of case. Neither rule would appear to be required to achieve the purposes sought by the statute.
IV
C. FEDERAL CRaINAL PROCEDURE: CUMrLATIVE SENTENCING

In enacting penal legislation, Congress has often made a single transaction
violative of several different statutory provisions. 1°8 The legislators, however,
seldom have indicated whether punishment for the consummated act precludes
separate punishment for the individual phases of the proscribed conduct. The
Supreme Court has often been faced with the issue of whether cumulative sentencing resulting from conviction for multiple offenses arising out of a single
transaction or fact situation violates either the legislative intent of Congress
or the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment.
Four cases decided by the Supreme Court in the 1958 Term dealt with the
vexatious problem of cumulative sentencing. In two of the cases, Ladner v.
United States'°9 and Heflin v. United States,"0 the Court struck down consecutive sentences. In one case, Harris v. United States,"' such sentences were upheld. And in the fourth case, Woody v. United States,"s decided per curiam by
an equally divided court,"' consecutive sentences were upheld. Notwithstanding the difficulties in comprehending the import of a per curiam decision rendered without citation by an equally divided court, Woody may shed light on
the Supreme Court's recent treatment of cumulative sentencing.
Petitioner, Woody, had been indicted under the National Motor Vehicle
Theft Act for the separate offenses of transporting a stolen automobile in interstate commerce" 4 and of receiving and concealing the same vehicle."' Independ108See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE of 1958, § 4704(a) prohibiting the purchases of narcotics
except in the original stamped package and 35 Stat. 614 (1909), as amended, 21 U.S.C.
§ 174 (1958) forbidding the receiving or concealing of narcotics known to havebeen unlawfully
imported.
109358 U.S. 169 (1958).
111359 U.S. 19 (1959).
110358 U.S. 415 (1959).

112359 U.S. 118 (1959).

", justice Stewart did not sit. As judge Stewart he had heard the case and written the
opinion for the Sixth Circuit. Woody v. United States, 258 F.2d 535 (1957).
U4 "Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce a motor vehicle or aircraft,
knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1958).
115"Whoever receives, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of any motor vehicle or
aircraft, moving as, or which is a part of, or which constitutes interstate or foreign commerce,
knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 2313 (1958).
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ent violation of each provision is punishable by a fine of $5,000, imprisonment
for five years, or both. Having been found guilty of both offenses, Woody received two five year sentences to be served consecutively. The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit denied leave to appeal in forma pauperis from both the
convictions and the cumulative sentences." 6 On certiorari to the Supreme
Court," 7 the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed per curiam by an

equally divided court.
Cumulative sentencing may be attacked as either contrary to the congressional purpose in enacting the particular penal legislation or violative of the
fifth amendment's protection against double jeopardy. It seems clear, however, that the double jeopardy contention carries little weight with the Court.
As early as 1927 the Court stated:
There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents Congress from punishing separately each step leading to the consummation of a transaction which it has power to
prohibit and punishing also the complete transaction),

Until recently, the Court's treatment of the contention that statutory interpretation precluded cumulative sentencing met with little better fate than the
double jeopardy contention." 9 The Court applied a "same evidence" test to
both contentions." 0 Basically, the test stands for the proposition that
when the same act or transaction violates a number of distinct statutory provisions, the determinant of whether one or more crimes have been committed
rests upon the dissimilarity of the evidence required to establish each offense.
Thus, if conviction under both statutory provisions does not require proof of

identical facts, neither the Constitution nor legislative intent is considered
violated by multiple prosecution and cumulative sentencing.
Recent decisions, however, evidence a changed judicial attitude regarding
multiple convictions and cumulative sentencing. In United States v. Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp."1' the Supreme Court held that a series of payments to em116

Woody v. United States, 258 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1957).
" 358 U.S. 802 (1958).
,18Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 11 (1927). See Gavieres v. United States, 220
U.S. 338 (1911). Cf. Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906).
"19
In United States v. Michener, 331 U.S. 789 (1946), the Court, in a per curiam decision
reversed the Court of Appeals, 157 F.2d 616 (1946), and reinstated convictions and cumulative
sentences for making a plate to produce counterfeit and for possessing that plate. Appellant's
contention that he could not have made the plate without having it in his possession was of
no avail. The Court relied on Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); see note
120 infra.
120 The leading case involving the "same evidence" test is Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299 (1932). The Court held that a single sale of morphine violated two provisions
of the Harrison Narcotics Act, 38 Stat. 785 (1914), as amended, 40 Stat. 1057, 1131 (1919);
and 38 Stat. 786 (1914). Cumulative sentences were upheld on the ground that each of the
offenses required proof of a different element.
121344 U.S. 218 (1952).
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22

ployees below the minimum set by the Fair Labor Standards Act' constituted
only a single criminal violation of that act rather than multiple offenses determined by the number of employees and the number of weeks in which underpayment occurred. Then in Bell v. United States,"' the Court held that the
simultaneous transportation of more than one woman in interstate commerce
in violation of the Mann ActI24 constituted only a single offense under that act.
Both Vniversal and Bell might be distinguished from the prior decisions on
the ground that they involved contemporaneous violations of only one statutory provision. The rationale in Bell, however, that "if Congress does not fix
the punishment for a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will
be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses,""' found
expression in the subsequent decision of Princev. UnitedStates.15 In Prince the
Court dealt with the propriety of cumulative sentencing under the Federal Bank
Robbery Act." 7 Prince, having been indicted and convicted for the separate

offenses of entering a bank with the intent to commit robbery and of robbery,
was sentenced to fifteen years for entering and twenty years for robbery; the
sentences to be served consecutively. Remanding the case to the district court
for purposes of resentencing, the Court held that Prince could be sentenced
only on the conviction for the robbery count. Two rationales prompted this
result. First, the Court inferred from the wording of the Act that "the unlawful
entry provision was inserted to cover the situation where a person enters a bank
for the purpose of committing a crime, but is frustrated for some reason before
completing the crime. '3 2S Consequently, the unlawful entry provision merged in
the consummated crime of robbery. Second, the Court, mindful of the inconclusive legislative history of the Bank Robbery Act reiterated its policy announced in Bell of "not attributing to Congress, in the enactment of criminal
statutes, an intention to punish more severely than the language of its laws
clearly imports ....,129
Both Ladner'" and Heflin,"' decided in the 1958 Term, relied on the policy
of lenity established in the Bell and Prince decisions. As in the earlier cases,
Ladner presented a situation where the language and the legislative history of
a statute were less than definite. Petitioner had been convicted of assaulting
two federal officers with a deadly weapon in violation of a federal statute which
prohibited interference with federal officers engaged in official dutiesY.2Having
12252 Stat. 1060, 1068-69 (1952), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215, 216(a) (1952).
123349 U.S. 81 (1955).
12436 Stat. 825 (1910), 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1958).
1-349 U.S. 81, 84 (1955).
12
126352 U.S. 322 (1957).
9Id. at 329.
12718 U.S.C. § 2113 (1958).
130 See note 109 supra.
128 352 U.S. 322, 328 (1957).
131See note 110 supra.
13248 Stat. 780, 781 (1934), 18 U.S.C. § 254 (1940) (consolidated into 18 U.S.C. § 111
(1958)).
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wounded the two officers with one blast from his shotgun, Ladner received a
ten year sentence for each assault, the sentences to run consecutively. Certiorari
was granted,'33 and an equally divided Court in a per curiam decision upheld
the sentences. 3 4 Upon reargument the Court vacated its prior judgment and
held that, in the absence of a clear expression by Congress to the contrary,
Ladner's single wrongful act did not constitute more than one offense under the
statute. Heflin, as Prince, involved multiple convictions and cumulative sentencing under the Federal Bank Robbery Act. Having been convicted of taking
33
property of a bank by force and violence, of receiving the property so stolen,'
and of conspiracy to violate the Act, petitioner was sentenced to consecutive
terms of imprisonment for each conviction. Due to apparent conflict with
Princeand in response to Heflin's contention that he could not be lawfully convicted of receiving and feloniously taking the same property, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 3 7 Reversing the conviction for "receiving" the Court
held that the legislative history of the statute indicated that the "receiving"
provision of the statute was meant to provide punishment only for the person who
subsequently obtained the stolen property; it was not meant to increase the
penalties imposed on the thief.
Notwithstanding the Harris' decision which seems to indicate that the
Court is less critical of cumulative sentencing in cases involving violation of the
federal narcotics laws, 3 9 the division of the Court in Woody appears curious in
light of Bell, Prince, Ladner and Hefin. The legislative history of the Motor
Vehicle Theft Act suggests two possible interpretations of the "receiver" provision. The House debates imply that the purpose of the "receiver" provision40
was to punish the individual who received the vehicle from the "transporter"'
133
352 U.S. 907 (1956).

134355 U.S. 282 (1958).

13618 U.S.C. § 2113(c) (1958).

137 357 U.S. 935 (1958).
238See note 111 supra.
135 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1958).
Cases involving cumulative sentencing for violation of federal narcotics laws have
139
generally followed the decision in Blockburger v. United States, note 120 supra. In Gore
v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958), the Court upheld multiple prosecution and cumulative
sentences for violations of §§ 4704(a) and 4705(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
and of § 2(c) of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, 35 Stat. 614 (1909), as amended,
21 U.S.C. 174 (1958). In affirming the convictions and sentencing, the Court not only relied
on its decision in Blockburger but also scrutinized the legislative history of the narcotics
legislation in accord with its recent practice in cases involving cumulative sentencing. At
page 390 the Court stated that "if the legislation reveals anything, it reveals the determination
of Congress to turn the screw of the criminal machinery-detection, prosecution and punishment-tighter and tighter."
In Harris, the question of cumulative sentences under § 4704(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code and § 2(c) of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act was again before the Court.
The Court held the Gore decision controlling.
140"It provides, gentlemen, for only two things. Section 3 [the present section 2312]
provides for the punishment of a thief stealing a car and transporting it from one State to another. Section 4 [the present section 2313] provides for the receipt of the stolen car by thieves
in another State for the purpose of selling and disposing of it." 58 CONG. Rxc. 5472 (1919)
(remarks of Congressman Dyer who proposed the bill).
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similar to the interpretation placed upon the "receiver" provision of the Bank
Robbery Act in Heflin.'4' From the Senate debates, on the other hand, it appears that the "receiver" provision was intended to fill up the interstices which
might not have been covered by the "transporter" provision.'" Although such
an interpretation would mean that the "receiver" and "transporter" provisions
cover the same persons, there is no indication in the legislative history that an
individual violating both sections was to be subjected to double confinement.
Since counsel for petitioner brought this ambiguous legislative history to the
Court's attention, it would appear that the import of Woody is that at least
four members of the Court are unwilling to extend the rationale of the Prince
decision outside of the area of the Federal Bank Robbery Act. In his opinion for
the Court of Appeals in Woody, Justice Stewart, then Judge Stewart, expressly
restricted the application of Prince to the statute involved.143 It would appear,
however, that Ladner, in which only justice Clark dissented, does represent
such an extension of Prince, at least to the extent that the Court there followed
its policy, first announced in Bell, of determining the validity of multiple conviction and cumulative sentencing in favor of the defendant unless either the
statutory language or legislative history reveals a Congressional intent to the
contrary. Thus, it would seem that the mechanical "same evidence" test (in
spite of Bell, Prince and the subsequent decisions,) still retains vitality in areas
other than the limited one of narcotics violation.
V
D. FEDERALISMt AND THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMNATION
The right of an individual to avoid self-incrimination in a jurisdiction other
than that in which he is testifying may have been restricted by the Supreme
Court in its summary disposition of Mills v. Louisiana.'"In a Louisiana grand
jury hearing, held in connection with an investigation of bribes allegedly given
to members of the New Orleans Police Department by petitioners and others,
141The general interpretation of statutes punishing receivers of stolen goods is that such
statutes do not authorize punishment for the thief. See PERurNs, CRnMznAr LAw 276 (1957).
In People v. Bigley, 178 Misc. 552, 554, 35 N.Y.S.2d. 130, 133 (Sup. Ct. 1942), the court
stated that: "To say that one can feloniously again receive from himself to himself what he
has already feloniously acquired by himself and taken unto himself is an absurdity." It would
appear that under the Motor Vehicle Act the "transporter" occupies an analogous position
to that of a thief. Punishment for both "transporting" and "receiving" would seem contrary
to Congressman Dyer's explanation of the bill. See note 140 supra.
142"The practice is to steal an automobile close to a State line and run it across the State
line. The first section is intended to punish anyone who does that thing, knowing the vehicle
to have been stolen.'The further practice is, if possible, to dispose of the vehicle to some
other party, confederate or otherwise, when it gets across the State line, and section 4 is for
the purpose of punishing a man who barters or sells or disposes of the property with intent
to deprive the owner of the possession thereof, or if he conceals it knowing it to have been
stolen. I think that would probably embrace every case that could be reached." 58 CoNG.
REc. 6434 (1919) (remarks of Senator Cummins).
'4' Woody v. United States, 258 F.2d 535, 537 (6th Cir. 1957).
14'360 U.S. 230 (1959).
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petitioners were ordered to answer questions put to them by the District Attorney for the Parish of Orleans. Although offered the appropriate immunity from
state prosecution, 4' they refused to answer, contending that they were in immediate danger of prosecution for tax evasion by the federal government and that
federal agents had collaborated and cooperated with the state investigating
officials. For this refusal the Criminal District Court of the Parish of Orleans
adjudged them guilty of contempt of court. The Supreme Court of Louisiana
rejected applications for writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. 46 The
147
Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, citing only Knapp v. Schweitzer.
Since the decision of Feldman v. United States4 5 it has been clear that testimony compelled in a state proceeding can be used against the witness in a subsequent federal prosecution unless "a representative of the United States is a
participant in the extortion of such evidence." 14 The witness would be protected could he refuse to testify in the state proceeding by asserting his federal
right against self-incrimination. This was attempted by the petitioner in Knapp
v. Schwveitzer ° but the Supreme Court found the Fifth Amendment inapplicable
to this situation and affirmed the contempt conviction. The Court applied and
expanded the "two sovereignties doctrine," which disregards jurisdictions other
than that in which the testimony is sought to be compelled in determining what
immunity need be given."'
"ILA. CONST. art. 19, § 13 (1921); LA. Rtv. STAT. ch. 14, § 121 (1950); LA. REV. STAT.
ch. 15, § 468 (1950).
145Record, No. 74, p. 97; No. 75, p. 51, Mills v. Louisiana, 360 U.S. 230 (1959).
147 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
148 322 U.S. 487 (1943).
49
1 Id. at 492. In noting this exception to the general rule of admissability of evidence, the
Court in Feldman relied on Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), a search and seizure
case under the Fourth Amendment.
10 357 U.S. 371 (1958).

"5'The doctrine emphasizes the separate and independent natures of state and federal governments in determining the scope of protection against self-incrimination. Testimony may
be compelled in a federal tribunal as long as complete immunity from federal prosecution is
afforded, regardless of the likelihood of state prosecution. United States v. Murdock, 284
U.S. 141 (1931); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). The doctrine had its beginning in decisions
put on the grcund that the testimony sought to be compelled was unlikely to be used in
a prosecution in another jurisdiction. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896) (witness fearing
state prosecution refused to answer questions before a federal tribunal); Jack v. Kansas,
199 U.S. 372 (1905) (witness fearing federal prosecution refused to answer questions before
a state tribunal). Two early decisions exonerated witnesses from testifying in a federal proceeding when a state prosecution appeared likely. Baimann v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1905); United
States v. Saline Bank of Virginia, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 100 (1828). The "two sovereignties" doctrine
is evaluated and its evolution traced in a series of articles by Professor J. A. C. Grant. Grant,
Immunity from Compulsory Self-Incrimination in a Federal System of Government, 9 Tzsp.
L.Q. 57 (1934); Grant, Federalism and Self-Incrimination, Part I, 4 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 459
(1957); Grant, Federalism and Self-Incrimination, Part II, 5 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 1 (1958).

Professor Grant criticizes the Court's use of its prior decisions in developing this doctrine
on several grounds. Among these is the failure to distinguish between the case of a witness
in a state court who fears federal prosecution and that of a federal court witness fearing state
prosecution. These situations would seem to involve very different constitutional problems.
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The Court in Knapp restricted the applicability of its decision to situations
involving no participation of federal agents in the state proceeding. "Whether,
in a case of such collaboration between state and federal officers, the defendant
could successfully assert his privilege in a state proceeding, we need not decide,
for the record before us is barren of evidence that the State was used as an instrument of federal prosecution or investigation."' 15 2 It seems strange that in the
Mills case the Court regarded Knapp as controlling since, as is pointed out by
Chief justice Warren in one of two dissenting opinions, " ' Mills would appear to
present the precise question which the Knapp Court expressly refused to decide.
The claim of the petitioner in Knapp of federal and state collaboration was
based on a statement of the United States Attorney that he intended to cooperate with the District Attorney in the prosecution of federal offenses which
arose out of the subject matter being investigated by the state. It would seem
that the petitioners in the Mills case had a more impressive case of federal-state
collaboration. The case came up on a stipulation of facts agreed to by counsel
for both respondent and petitioners. Included in the stipulation was the
following.
That there has existed, and now exists, close cooperation and collaboration between
the District Attorney for the Parish of Orleans and the United States Attorney for the
Eastern District of Louisiana and the Internal Revenue Service of the United States
of America and its investigators, as well as with the Police Bureau of Investigation of
the City of New Orleans in reference to members of the New Orleans Police Department regarding public bribery and income tax evasion....
It was further alleged and admitted that the petitioners were then under investigation by the United States Department of Internal Revenue and that they
had been required by this department to sign waivers extending the period of
limitations for assessment of back income and profits taxes.' 5 The statutory
period of limitations for a prosecution for tax evasion had not lapsed. 55
The per curiam affirmance of the Louisiana contempt conviction, citing only
Knapp, leaves unclear the position the Court was taking. Most probably, the
Court felt the Mills record was as barren of evidence of cooperation and collaboration as that in Knapp and, therefore, found the cases to be on all fours.
152357 U.S. at 380.
153 The other, by Mr. justice Douglas, argues that Knapp was wrongly decided and that
the federal right against self-incrimination must be protected in all courts. A few state courts
have accomplished this themselves by interpreting their state constitutions to guarantee
protection from both state and federal self-incrimination. State ex rel. Mitchell v. Kelly, 71
So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1954); People v. Den Uyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W.2d 284 (1947); In re Cohen,
295 Mich. 748, 295 N.W. 481 (1940); In re Schnitzer, 295 Mich. 736, 295 N.W. 478 (1940);
In re Watson, 293 Mich. 263, 291 N.W. 652 (1940). Accord: State v. Dominguez, 228 La.
284, 82 So. 2d 12 (1955); State ex rel. Doran v. Doran, 215 La. 151, 39 So. 2d 894 (1949).
254 Record, No. 74, pp. 46, 53; No. 75, p. 15.
15 Record, No. 74, pp. 44, 52; No. 75, p. 15.
1-68A Stat. 815 (1954), 26 U.S.C. § 6531 (1954).
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In making such a finding, the Court might have found persuasive the respondent's argument that the stipulated cooperation was only "in reference to members of the New Orleans Police Department"'6 7 and not necessarily to those who
were thought to have bribed them. This limited interpretation of the stipulation is rendered somewhat implausible by the unchallenged existence of an investigation of petitioners by the United States Department of Internal Revenue. That the petitioners had been requested to, and did, sign consent waivers
extending the period of limitation in regard to assessment of back taxes raises
a strong inference that the cooperation of the federal officers in the state proceedings included the petitioners in its scope. A United States Attorney is not
likely to acknowledge that he was attempting to take advantage of the doctrine
recognizing a state's autonomy in order to further federal prosecutions. Taken
as a whole, the evidence in Mills presents as close an approximation of such an
acknowledgement as a case is likely to present. If the Court found this evidence
inadequate, it seems to have so narrowed the category of collaboration cases as
to make it virtually non-existent.
In view of the harshness of this result it may not be amiss to consider an
interpretation of the Mills case other than that directly suggested by the citation of Knapp. It is possible that the Court believed this was a case of federalstate collaboration but affirmed the convictions because it felt that the proper
time for the petitioners to object would be at the predicted subsequent federal
prosecution. Under this interpretation the case would stand for the principle
that a witness, if offered immunity from state prosecutions, must testify at the
state level regardless of the existence of federal-state collaboration. Proof of collaboration, however, would render the compelled testimony inadmissable in a
subsequent federal proceeding. This explanation of Mills is suggested by the
dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas. Douglas' insistence that the federal right could
be asserted in the state proceeding158 may be an indication that the majority of
the Court felt the right more properly invoked in a federal tribunal. The principle suggested by this interpretation of the Mills case is not in conflict with
Feldman v. UnitedStates'5S in which compelled testimony was admitted in a subsequent federal trial, since the Feldman decision explicitly excepted cases of
federal-state collaboration. 6 ' There would, however, be practical difficulties in
protecting an individual from self-incrimination in this way. It has long been
accepted that the Fifth Amendment protects witnesses not only from the introduction of compelled testimony at a subsequent trial but also from the use of
any "derivative" evidence which was discovered only because of the compelled
117
Record, No. 74, pp. 46, 53; No. 75, p. 15.

158 "It is, therefore, too late to protect the federal right if one waits for action by the federal
court. The federal right is lost irretrievably, if it is not saved by the state court." 360 U.S.
at 238 (Douglas, J., dissenting). (Italics in original.).
159
322 U.S. 487 (1943).
160
Text accompanying note 149 supra.
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testimony.'' There would be rather complex problems of proof at the federal
trial in determining whether or not evidence had been "derived" from the compelled testimony. 62 To attach this meaning to the Mills case is, of course, to
engage in unsubstantiated speculation, since the bare citation of the Knapp
case would seem a strange way for the Court to indicate its acceptance of such
a principle. Speculation of this sort is perhaps unavoidable, however, when the
Court disposes of cases involving complex issues in one sentence per curiam
opinions. The Mills decision leaves in doubt the type of protection, if any,
which is to be afforded an individual against federal use of state machinery to
obtain compulsory testimony.
VI
E. NEwSPAPERS AND
FEDERAL JIDIcIARY
In Marshall v. United States'6 the Court granted a new trial to petitioner,
who had been convicted of unlawfully dispensing certain drugs without a prescription from a licensed physician.' During the trial some of the jurors had
read newspaper articles stating that Marshall had a past criminal record. This
evidence, originally offered by the prosecutor to refute a defense of entrapment, 6' had been rejected by the trial judge as prejudicial to defendant.
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
But it would seem that cases involving federal-state collaboration would normally
justify disallowance of a wide range of evidence as "derived."
16'
360 U.S. 310 (1959), reversing 258 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1958).
16452 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C.A. § 301-92 (1958).
161
16

"'The Supreme Court denied certiorari on the issue of entrapment, 358 U.S. 892 (1958).
Certiorari was granted only on the question of "Whether a defendant in a criminal trial
to a jury is denied a fair trial when members of the jury during the course of the trial read
newspaper articles which state that the defendant has a record of two previous felony convictions and recite other defamatory matter." Ibid.
The issue of entrapment previously divided the court in all three cases in which it has
been the ground of decision. In Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), Chief Justice
Hughes, writing for the majority, and justice Roberts, writing for the three concurring justices,
disagreed on the nature of entrapment; on whether its source is statute or public policy, on
whether it is a question for the court or the jury, and on the evidence the government may
introduce to refute it. The Court divided on the same questions in two 1958 cases, Sherman
v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958), and Masciale v.United States, 356 U.S. 386 (1958).
Chief justice Warren, for the majority, followed the Hughes theory; justice Frankfurter and
three others urged the adoption of the Roberts theory.
Marshall v.United States is sufficiently similar to the Sherman case to raise the same
entrapment issues once more. Marshall, like Sherman, relied on the evidence of a government
witness for substantiation of his claim of entrapment. At Marshall's trial, the government
offered evidence (which the judge refused to admit)of Marshall's past as tending to refute
entrapment, and entrapment was submitted to the jury. The court of appeals in Marshall
considered entrapment issues and interpreted Sherman to mean that entrapment is for the
court when the defense depends on the undisputed testimony of a government witness.
Perhaps the Court declined to consider entrapment again because it felt one year after Sherman
and Masciale was too soon; perhaps the addition of justice Stewart to the Court has not
changed the division that appeared in those cases. Perhaps it is impossible to work out a logical
system of rules governing entrapment. See Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal
Courts, 90 U. PA. L. Rav. 245 (1942).
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Though the jurors had assured the judge that the articles had not influenced
them,166 and though appropriate instructions had been given, 17 the Supreme
Court held that the material was so prejudicial that it should not have reached
the jurors, and the safeguards taken by the trial court were not adequate to
remove the need for a new trial.
The Supreme Court long ago decided that a conviction is not automatically
vitiated because jurors read newspaper comments on the case before them.'"
But the trial court has discretion to determine whether exposure of jurors to
newspaper comments on the case makes it necessary to discharge the jury be70
The trial court is to
fore it has rendered a verdict 69 or to grant a new trialY.
decide whether the independence and freedom of each juror, essential to a fair
trial, is still present.'7 Thus in deciding whether a fair trial has been impaired
the lower federal courts followed two general principles: some newspaper articles are intrinsically not prejudicial because of their innocuous content; 72 and
even prejudicial material need 7not prevent conviction if the court is satisfied
the jurors can resist its effects.' '
While many comments read by jurors have been held to be innocuous,' 74 there
were cases prior to Marshall which held newspaper comments prejudicial. 17A
juror's reading of a newspaper comment on defendant's refusal to testify,
which neither court nor counsel could have pointed out in court, as well as a
newspaper report that defendants had confessed, 76 have been held in the federal
courts to deny defendants a fair trial. It also had been held by the Supreme Court,
in Mattox v. UnitedStates,17 that jurors' reading of an article which reported that
defendant had been once before tried for his life was sufficiently prejudicial to
call for a new trial. 78 But the Court in Marshall chose not to rely on Mattox, a
117
Brief for United States, pp. 7-8.
M360 U.S. 310, 312 (1959).
United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851).
168
169Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891).
170Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).

Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148, 155 (1891).
courts have found no prejudice in accurate accounts of the trial, Tinkoff v.
United States, 86 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1936), cerf. denied 301 U.S. 689 (1937); see Madden v.
United States, 20 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1927), cert. denied 275 U.S. 554 (1927), or in statements
the newspapers said were merely assertions of the prosecution, McHenry v. United States,
276 Fed. 761 (D.C. Cir. 1921).
173E.g., United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1951), cerl. denied 343 U.S. 946
(1952).
174 See cases cited in note 172 supra.
175
United States v. Ogden, 105 Fed. 371, 374 (E.D. Pa. 1900).
"7 Griffin v. United States, 295 Fed. 437 (3rd Cir. 1924).
17

172Circuit

177

146 U.S. 140, (1892).

is not open to reasonable doubt that the tendency of that article was injurious
to the defendant. Statements that the defendant had been tried for his life once before;
that the evidence against him was claimed to be very strong by those who had heard all the
178 "It
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case which was clearly applicable; nor did the Court mention any of the other
specific newspaper comments which have been held ground for a new trial. The
Court rather stated its rule in the broadest terms: that a new trial should be
granted because the jurors read information "of a character which the trial judge
ruled was so prejudicial it could not be directly offered as evidence."'17 9
Exactly what effect the Court's statement of the rule may have cannot, of
course, be accurately stated. It may have influence on the conduct of prosecuting attorneys, for if the letter of the rule is to be followed, an offering of evidence which the trial judge rules prejudicial may, if the offered evidence finds
its way into the newspapers, imperil the prosecution's case.
But if the full implications of Marshallare realized a practical result may be
closer supervision of juries. A Supreme Court case as early as 1851,10 and subsequent circuit court decisions,"' indicated that the effect of prejudicial material read by jurors could be cured if the judge received from the jurors assurances
that they were not influenced,8 2 followed by an instruction to disregard what
had been read. 8 3 In Marshallboth these factors were present, and yet without
discussing their relevance the Court ordered the new trial. That this silent
reversal184 makes some change in the law cannot be doubted. Many of the circuit court cases in which the juror's assurance and judge's instruction were
said to cure prejudice are cases in which the reports also were held to be nonprejudicial.' But the judge's actions also have been considered effective in the
testimony; that the argument for the prosecution was such that the defendant's friends gave
up all hope of any result but conviction; and that it was expected that the deliberations
of the jury would not last an hour before they would return a verdict, could have no other
tendency." 146 U.S. 140, 150 (1892). See also United States v. Ogden, 105 Fed. 371 (E.D.
Pa. 1900).

360 U.S. 310, 312 (1959).

179

180

United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851).

18 See cases cited notes 182 and 183 infra.
182See Welch v. United States, 135 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Shackow v. Gov't. of Canal
Zone, 108 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1939); United States v. Wolf, 102 F. Supp. 824 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
183 See United States v. Hirsch, 74 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1934).
184The Court was careful to preface its holding with the caveat, "The trial judge has
a large discretion in ruling on the issue of prejudice resulting from the reading by jurors of
news articles concerning the trial. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 251. Generalizations
beyond that statement are not profitable, because each case must turn on its special facts."
Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312 (1959).
That "each case must turn on its own facts" may foreshadow a possible future distinguishing of Marshall. Until such time, however, the "special facts" of Marshall-information
ruled prejudicial by the trial judge, plus questioning of jurors and an instruction-will continue
to require a new trial.
15Welch v. United States, 135 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Shackow v. Gov't. of Canal
Zone, 108 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1939); United States v. Hirsch, 74 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1934);
Madden v. United States, 20 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1927); United States v. Wolf, 102 F. Supp.
824 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
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face of admittedlyprejudicial testimony. In UnitedStatesv.Postma,188 newspapers
printed exaggerated articles concerning the stabbing of a witness for the prosecution. The court did not deny the prejudicial nature of the stories, but declined to order a new trial on the ground that the judge had secured assurances
from the two jurors who had read the stories that no prejudice had resulted
and had admonished the jurors not to take the articles into account. 18 7 The
court considered the judge's actions crucial; for it distinguished a previous
circuit court case188 on the grounds that in that case there was not the "forceful
admonition of the judge"1 89 as in Postma.
Marshall,by failing to consider the effect of the trial judge's actions, is bound
to have significant influence on the course of future trials. For its test is whether
the newspaper article is prejudicial. If it is, no action by the trial judge can cure
the prejudice. If the news report is not prejudicial it would seem that the trial
judge's actions become less important. And placing paramount importance on
the content of the article means that great precautions will have to be taken to
prevent the news report from reaching the jury. This would necessitate closer
supervision of juries; which, it has been argued, would be impractical for trials
in large cities. 8
But though Marshall may have substantial effect on jury trials, the Court
was careful to delineate the basis of its decision and to limit that effect to the
federal courts. It had been unclear in previous cases on exactly what ground a
new trial was ordered when the jurors received prejudicial information. The
opinions only spoke vaguely in terms of a "fair trial." The Court in Marshall
repeatedly emphasized that the basis of its decision was its "supervisory power
to formulate proper standards for enforcement of the criminal law in the federal
courts."' 9 ' Whether Marshallforeshadows a possible due process holding in this
area cannot be known; it may well be that the Court's care to avoid due process
problems in Marshallwill be scrupulously continued. That a due process holding
is not impossible may be indicated by the concurring opinion of two justices in
Shepherd v. Florida,'9 ' that a false newspaper report of the defendant's confes186242 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1957).
l87 Id. at 495
188Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1955).
189United States v. Postma, 242 F.2d 488, 495 (2d Cir. 1957).
"'United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1951). "Trial by newspaper may be
unfortunate, but it is not new and, unless the court accepts the standard judicial hypothesis
that cautioning instructions are effective, criminal trials in the large metropolitian centers
may well prove impossible." Id. at 857. Frank, J., dissenting, found the argument empty:
"My colleagues admit that 'trial by newspaper' is unfortunate. But they dismiss it as an unavoidable curse of metropolitan living (like, I suppose, crowded subways). They rely on the
old 'ritualistic admonition' to purge the record. The futility of that sort of exorcism is notorious.
As I have elsewhere observed, it is like the Mark Twain story of the little boy who was told
to stand in a comer and not to think of a white elephant." Id. at 865.
191360 U.S. 310, 311, 313 (1959).
192341 U.S. 50 (1951).
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sion, read by the jurors, was a denial of due process.19 Shepherd can, however,
easily be distinguished. The arguments there also involved the effects of violence
which enveloped the trial,'94 a fact which also was relied upon in the concurring
opinion.' However, the possible use of Shepherd in the future is uncertain, since
it too was a cryptic per curiam opinion.
VII
F. COST ALLOCATION AND SUBSTANTIVE DuE PRoCEss
The Supreme Court dismissed for want of a substantial federal question two
cases 96 in which it was contended that alleged arbitrary cost allocations by
state agencies contravened the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In each case the state agency, acting pursuant to a state statute, had
ordered a railroad to pay the entire cost of improvements at an intersection of
the road's trackage with a public thoroughfare. The per curiam disposition of
these two cases may be explained by the Court's lack of concern with claims
of substantive due process in the area of economic regulation; 97 however, the
prior decisions of the Supreme Court in this area and the present confusion engendered in the state courts strongly suggest that a reasoned opinion would
have been appropriate.
PennsylvaniaR.R. v. Borough of Sayreville,9 s the first of the cases presenting
the cost apportionment issue in the 1958 Term, concerned an order that the
railroad reconstruct, at its sole expense, a bridge carrying a county road over
the carrier's right of way. In reviewing the agency's order, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey determined that a 1947 statute limiting railroad expenditures to
fifteen per cent of cost'99 applied only to new grade separations."' 0 The court
applied a 190301 statute which it interpreted as requiring the road to pay 100
per cent of cost in all cases. Under this interpretation, the agency which made
the initial cost allocation was precluded from considering any special facts
which the railroad alleged made the agency's cost determination inappropriate.
In SouthernPac. Co. v. CorporationCorm'nof Arizona,0 2 the Commission had
9

1Id. at 52-53 (concurring opinion).
Brief for petitioners, pp. 26-30.
19s Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 53-54 (1951) (concurring opinion).
109Southern Pac. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n. of Ariz., 359 U.S. 532 (1959); Pennsylvania
R.R. v. Borough of Sayreville, 358 U.S. 44 (1958).
117 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.
v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
'

194

198 358 U.S. 44 (1958).

N.J. REv. STAT. tit. 48, § 12-62 (Supp. 1955).
200 26 N.J. 197, 139 A.2d 97 (1958).
199

201N.J. REv. STAT. tit. 48, § 12-49 (1937).
202359 U.S.

532 (1959).
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ordered the road to bear the sole expense for the installation of two signal units.
The Commission had refused to consider any circumstances which the road contended justified imposition of a portion of the cost on the city of Tucson. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of Arizona, the Commission's order was upheld as
the court interpreted the statute providing for the improvements 03 as requiring
the Commission, once it has found an improvement necessary, to assess the
road for the total expense without consideration of further evidence °4
On appeal to the Supreme Court, both roads relied on the doctrine claimed
to have been established in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters.2 In that case
the Supreme Court had invalidated the application of a Tennessee statute
which required the state commission, when it found eliminations of grade crossings necessary, to charge the road one-half of all costs. Mr. justice Brandeis,
speaking for the Court, stated that while the statute was not unconstitutional
per se, the state tribunals were required to consider the special circumstances in
each case in order to determine if the application of the statute would be "so
arbitrary and unreasonable as to deprive [the railway] of property without due
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." 2 6 The "special
facts" dictating the result in Nashville were summarized by the Court:
[T]he revolutionary changes incident to transportation wrought in recent years by
the widespread introduction of motor vehicles; the assumption by the Federal Government of the functions of road builder; the resulting depletion of rail revenue; the change
in the character, the construction and the use of the highways; the change in the occasion for elimination of grade crossings, in the purpose of such elimination, and in the
chief beneficiaries thereof; and the change in the relative responsibility of the railroads
and vehicles moving on the highways as elements of danger and causes of accidents. 2 7
Supreme Court decisions prior to Nashville had held that a state might require
a railroad to contribute up to the full cost for roadway improvements. 2 8 Although in each of these cases the Court might have relied on "special facts"
similar to those which dictated the decision in Nashville, the Court uniformly
rejected the roads' claims of arbitrariness. In view of these former decisions,
commentators heralded Nashville as marking a significant change in the law.02 9
The decision was viewed as a precursor to "fairer" apportionment of costs in
improving grade crossings through mandatory consideration of all surrounding
circumstances.
The effect of Nashville, however, has been somewhat less than dramatic. In
its only subsequent consideration of the issue, the Supreme Court, in A tchison,
213
Ariz. Rxv. STAT. § 40-336 (1956).
204
84 Ariz. 365, 329 P.2d 883 (1958).

206
Id. at 413.
207

Id. at 416.
Valley R.R. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 278 U.S. 24 (1928); Erie R.R.
v. Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394 (1921); MAissouri Pac. Ry. v. City of Omaha, 235 U.S.
121 (1914); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. City of Minneapolis, 232 U.S. 430 (1914).
209 23 CAirr. L. Rlv. 631 (1935); N.C.L. Rlv. 491 (1935); 44 YALE L.J. 1259 (1935).
2-294 U.S. 405 (1935).
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T. & S.F. Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n," ' acknowledged that Nashvilleforbade an
unreasonable cost allocation. Nevertheless, the Court upheld an order assessing
the carrier one-half of the cost of an improvement from which the railway
would derive no benefit. The Court held that benefit to the railroad was immaterial in determining cost allocation where the improvement was necessitated
by local necessity and convenience. Nashville was further distinguished from the
case at hand by the Court's declaration that the state procedure in Nashville
allowed the tribunal no discretion in allocating cost, while the Commission in
Atchison had held hearings before determining the assessment.
State courts have experienced difficulties in attempting to determine the
permissible boundaries of cost allocation in view of Nashville and its subsequent
treatment in Atchison. Generally the state courts have followed one of three
paths. First, two courts have held that Nashville requires judicial consideration
of all relevant circumstances in order to determine whether a particular allocation is arbitrary.2" Second, some courts have followed Nashville by reversing
allocations made without consideration of "special facts" where the improvements were only to provide for increased convenience rather than safety.2
And third, some courts have limited the application of Nashville to those situations in which the improvement was not in response to local needs2 13
In view of the confusion in state courts when faced with the question of cost
apportionment, it may be suggested that Pennsylvania R.R. and Southern
Pacific merited more than per curiam dismissals. By dismissing for want of a
substantial federal question the Court has avoided an opportunity to furnish
guidance to the state courts by clarifying its present position. These courts and
state legislatures may still be troubled by the apparent vitality of the Nashville
decision.
Viii
G. Busmrss EX
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The Supreme Court in Peurifoy v. Commissioner," utilized the per curiam
decision as a vehicle to delay consideration of the troublesome issue of differentiating business from personal traveling expenses under the Internal Revenue
210 346 U.S. 346 (1953).
211Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. City of Kansas City, 173 Kan. 473, 249 P.2d 671 (1952);
Lehigh &New England R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 126 Pa. Super. 351, 191 Ati. 380 (1937).
212 City of Winston-Salem v. Southern Ry., 248 N.C. 637, 105 S.E.2d 37 (1958); In reElimination of Existing Highway-Railroad Crossing, 254 App. Div. 412, 5 N.Y.S.2d 946
(1938).The Atchison case has been thought to dispense with the necessity of considering"special
facts" when safety improvements are involved. New York Cent. R.R. v. City of Detroit,
354 Mich. 637, 93 N.W.2d 481 (1958) (dissenting opinion in case affirming decision of lower
court by an equally divided court).
213 State v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 273 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1954); State v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
340 Mo. 225, 100 S.W.2d 522 (1936); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Driscoll, 330 Pa. 97, 198 Atl.
130 (1938) (dictum).
214 358 U.S. 59 (1958).
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Code. The code provides for the deduction of: "traveling expenses (including
the entire amount expended for meals and lodging) while away from home in
5
the pursuit of a trade or business.'
The only prior decision of the Supreme Court in this area was Commissioner
v. Flowers.2 16 This case involved the deductibility of meals and lodging incurred
at the principal place of business of the taxpayer who maintained his residence
two hundred miles distant from his principal place of business. The Court found
it unnecessary to decide the meaning of the term, "home," and disposed of the
case by holding the expenses to have been incurred as the result of the taxpayer's personal convenience and choice rather than necessitated by the
"exigencies of business. 217
The Commissioner and the Tax Court, both before 18 and after 219 Flowers,
have consistently considered "home" to mean one's post of duty or principal
place of business rather than residence. This definition plus the necessary determination that the expenses were incurred in the pursuit of business proved
sufficient to dispose of the case of the traveling salesman, 22 who resided near his
business headquarters and to exclude the long distance commuter as in Flowers.2- However, this definition of "home" proved unsatisfactory in those cases
involving temporary construction workers who maintained a single residence from
which they traveled to their various temporary construction jobs. In these instances, since it would not be reasonable to require the taxpayer to transfer
his residence and family to every construction job, the Tax Court 222 and the
Commissioner 22 maintained that those expenses incurred at the taxpayer's post
21

6 Peurifoy v. Commissioner arose under § 23(a) (1)(A) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code.
§ 162(a)(2) of the 1954 Code is identical to the 1939 provisions. Personal, living and family
expenses are expressly excluded by § 24(a) (1) of the 1939 Code, and § 262 of the 1954 Code.
217
216326 U.S. 465 (1946).
Id. at 474.
218See Charles E. Duncan, 17 B.T.A. 1088 (1929), aff'd per curiam 47 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir.
1931); Mort L. Bixler, 5 B.T.A. 1181 (1927); O.D. 905,4 Cum. BuLL. 212 (1921); O.D. 1021,
5 Cum. BuLL.174 (1921); Mim. 2688,4 Cam. Buu. 209 (1921); I.T. 1264, 1-1 Cus .BuL. 122
(1922); I.T. 1355, 1-1 Cums. BuLL.194 (1922); I.T. 1380, 1-2 Cum. BuLL.88 (1922); I.T. 1404,
1-2 Cus . BuLL. 145 (1922); G.C.M. 4956, VII-2 Cums. BurL. 128 (1928); I.T. 3314, 1939-2
Curm. BuLL. 152; G.C.M. 23672, 1943 Cum. BuLn. 66. Only the ninth circuit had expressly
renounced this definition and had insisted on "home" being taken in its ordinary meaning.
Wallace v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1944). See also Coburn v. Commissioner, 138
F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1943); E. G. Leach, 12 T.C. 20 (1949); Harry F. Schurer, 3 T.C. 544 (1944).
219 E.g., Kershner, 14 T.C. 168 (1950).
22
1
221

Appeal of Sonenblick, 4 B.T.A. 986 (1926); Appeal of Burgio, 4 B.T.A. 4 (1926).
E.g., Walter M. Priddy, 43 B.T.A. 18 (1940).
222
See Ney v. United States, 171 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1948); Bercaw v. Commissioner, 165
F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1948); Barnhill v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1945); James R.
Whitaker, 24 T.C. 750 (1955); Willard S. Jones, 13 T.C. 880 (1949); Henry C. Warren, 13
T.C. 205 (1949); Beatrice H. Albert, 13 T.C. 129 (1949); Robert F. Green, 12 T.C. 656 (1949);
John D. Johnson, 8 T.C. 303 (1947); Arnold P. Bark, 6 T.C. 851 (1946); S.M. R. O'Hara,
6 T.C. 841 (1946); George W. Lindsay, 34 B.T.A. 840 (1936).
223 Letter Ruling (May 4, 1956), 565 CCH Par. 6428; 1944 Cum. Bun. 24.
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of duty would be deductible provided the taxpayer continually returned to
the same residence at the termination of a job the duration of which was "temporary" as opposed to "indefinite" or "indeterminate."
Application of this exception, formulated by the Tax Court, has required the
development of an elaborate list of indicia. Such factors as length of employment, 224 duration of the job,2 2 and the intent of the taxpayer when he com-

menced his employment22 have been significant in determining whether the
employment was temporary. Other considerations such as union hiring, 227 location and extent of family,

28

home ownership, 229 etc., have gone to the issue of

whether one has an established residence to which he consistently returned.
It is in this context, i.e., the Commissioner's and the Tax Court's treatment
of the statutory term "home" as meaning post of duty, with the "temporary"
employment exception, that the Peurifoy case arose. The Supreme Court had
passed on neither the precise meaning of "home," 230 the validity of the "temporary" exception, nor the appropriateness of the several factors that had become influential in the question whether the taxpayer was engaged in "temporary" employment.
In Peurifoy v. Commissioner,23' taxpayers, construction workers on sites approximately one hundred miles distant from their normal residences, claimed
deductions for meals and lodging while on jobs lasting over twenty, twelve, and
eight months. Each taxpayer was a home owner; two of the three were married.
The Commissioner conceded the deductibility of the lodging and meal expenses
of one of the petitioners for jobs extending only three and seven weeks, but disallowed the deductions for the longer periods. The Tax Court, stressing both the
nature of the work and the length of the employment, held 232 that the work was
224

Coburn v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1943); E. G. Leach, 12 T.C. 20 (1949);
Harry F. Schurer, 3 T.C. 544 (1944).
2- Ralph A. Waugh, 9 T.C.M. 600 (1950); Beatrice H. Albert, 13 T.C. 129 (1949).
22
6 Willard S. Jones, 13 T.C. 880 (1949); Arnold P. Bark, 6 T.C. 851 (1946). Recent cases
have formalized the several indicia into the following test: Employment is "temporary" where
"termination can be foreseen within a fixed or reasonably short period of time." John J. Harvey, CCH Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. 23,785 (September 30, 1959). See also, Walter J. Kent, CCH
Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. 23,798(M) (October 20, 1959); Harvey R. Huber, CCH Tax Ct. Rep. Dec.
23,799 (M) (October 20, 1959); Glendyl R. Hendricks, CCH Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. 23,800 (M)
(October 20, 1959); Jeff L. Hendrix, CCH Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. 23,801 (M) (October 20, 1959).
227 Ralph A. Stegner, 14 T.C.M. 1081 (1955). See the discussion by the Tax Court in James
F. Peurifoy, 27 T.C. 149, 150-1 (1956).
228
Wesley H. Harrington, 12 T.C.M. 436 (1953).
22
9In James E. Peurifoy all three petitioners "owned" their homes. It apparently made
no difference that one of the petitioners was unmarried. 27 T.C. at 150.
210 In a Comment of Peurifoy v. Commissioner in 44 CoRN. L.Q. 270 (1959), it was argued that the opinion in the Flowers case required the conclusion that the Court meant
"home" to mean principal place of business. Although perhaps true for this particular case,
it is doubtful that the inference can be extended beyond that case.
231358 U.S. 59 (1958).

232

27 T.C. 149 (1956).
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"temporary," as opposed to "indefinite" in nature, and that it would "not be
reasonable to expect them to shift their residences to the place of employment
' 233
or to regard [the construction site] as their 'home' for tax purposes.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed T3 the Tax Court on the
grounds that its finding that the employment was "temporary" was grossly in
error. This Court emphasized the fact that the particular construction jobs
were of substantial duration and the somewhat shorter employment of the
petitioners was the result of voluntary termination.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but in its per curiam decision expressly declined to pass upon the approach of the Tax Court, instead choosing to
limit the case to the "narrow question of fact-Was the petitioners' 'employment' 'temporary' or 'indefinite?' "236 Refusing to disturb the findings of the
Court of Appeals, the Court affirmed the decision. The three-justice dissent237
written by justice Douglas urged that the definition of "home" in the instant
case be considered as the taxpayers' residence and since these expenses were
necessary if the taxpayers were to carry on their chosen trade, even though not
necessary to their employer's business, argued that the deduction should be
allowed.
The disposition of this case by the majority opinion certainly does not reject
the reasoning of both the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals,23 but the Court's
specific rejection of the opportunity to consider and foreclose some of the conflicts in this area perhaps suggests that the past approach of the Tax Court is
not fully in accord with the Supreme Court's conception of the determinative
factors.
It may be that the reluctance of the Court to consider the Peurifoy issue is
largely due to the fact that two distinct approaches to the problem have evolved
-the intermingling of which has created unnecessary confusion. While the
rationale of the Flowers case adopts the "pursuit of business" clause the Tax
Court and the Commissioner, to resolve traveling expense issues, have chosen
to emphasize the "away from home" provision. Neither approach, however, is
in itself adequate to deal with the circumstances of the Peurifoy case. The Tax
Court found it necessary to introduce into its definition of "home" the "temporary" employment qualification in order to circumvent its premise that home
equals principal place of business. Likewise, the narrow Flowers rationale had to
be amplified by consideration of duration of employment to determine more
accurately whether the expense was motivated by personal convenience or
233

Id. at 157.

254 F.2d 483 (1957).
236358 U.S. at 60-61.
235356 U.S. 956 (1958).
237 358 U.S. at 61.
238 It is arguable that the per curiam opinion, by considering whether the employment was
of a temporary nature, implicitly admitted the validity of the Tax Court's temporary-employment exception. The more accurate view, it is submitted, is that the Court, finding that the
employment was indefinite did not have to pass upon the soundness of the exception.
234
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"business exigencies." Since, however, the duration of employment is ultimately
crucial to each approach, the results obtained in the Peurifoy-type situation
will be identical.
However, this confusion may be eliminated by according to the term "home"
its everyday meaning, i.e., the taxpayer's residence. Assuming the taxpayer to
be away from his residence, each case can be decided by employing the rationale
of the Flowers opinion, and the question there posed: was the expense motivated
by "the exigencies of business rather than the personal conveniences and necessities of the traveler ....23 9
The statutory term "home" then need only be considered on two occasions.
First, in those cases involving migratory workers240 the determination must be
made whether or not the taxpayer has a "home." If not, he would not satisfy
the statutory requirement that the expenses be incurred away from home.
Where a taxpayer has two residences and a business near each, 241 the question
of the proper tax home must again be considered. The issue in these circumstances is what is his primary home and business, for only those expenses incurred while away from that home and business will be deductible. By thus
limiting considerations of the term "home" to these narrow situations a step can
be taken towards reducing the confusion surrounding this heavily litigated
issue.

242

IX

H. TEE Tw aIrTZoiE AND LoNGSHORM.N's R1 mnDiEs
The Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act of
192743 establishes a system of federal compensation for certain classes of injured maritime employees as. their exclusive remedy but only "if recovery...
through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by
State law."

244

State law provides a valid remedy when the injury occurs under

circumstances which are "maritime but local." 24 Prior to Davis v. Department
of Labor,2 injured waterfront workers were confronted with the risk of guessing
whether the accident fell under the state or federal compensation system, with
the danger that a wrong guess could lead to no recovery whatsoever if the
2i9
326 U.S. 465, 474 (1946).
240 S James v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 270 (D.C. Nev. 1959); T. V. Osburn, 17
T. C. M. 310 (1958). Cf. Charles A. Gustafson, 3 T.C. 998 (1944).
241
E.g., Joseph H. Sherman, Jr., 16 T.C. 332 (1951). Compare S. lI. R. O'Hara, 6 T.C.
841 (1951).
22
1 For an excellent discussion of the problems in this area before Peurifoy v. Commissioner,
see Comment, 19 U. CH.L .REv. 534 (1952). For a discussion of the Peurifoy case, see 107
U. PA. L. REv. 871 (1959).
24,344 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1952).
24433

U.S.C. § 903 (1952).

Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rhode, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,
257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921).
248 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
245 See
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statutory period for the other compensation system had elapsed.247 The Supreme
Court in Davis set out a practical solution to this problem: the "twilight zone"
-a rule that the plaintiff's choice
of compensation system would be presumed
2 48
correct in all doubtful cases.
Hahn v. Ross IslandSand & GravelCo., 4 involved an injury in Oregon clearly
within the twilight zone. However, the Oregon Compensation Act permitted
employers to elect between compensation coverage or common law liability
without the benefit of the traditional common law defenses.210 The employer
in Hahn had rejected the compensation plan, and his injured employee brought
suit against him in the state courts instead of filing for federal compensation.
The Oregon Supreme Court held that the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor
Worker's Act did not envisage a choice between federal compensation and a
state damage action, but only a choice between federal and state compensation
systems. The damage action was disallowed and the plaintiff was told that his
only recovery was by way of federal compensation2 8
The United States Supreme Court rejected this interpretation. Nothing in
the Longshoremen's Act or the Constitution barred such a suit said the Court,
and,
[Pletitioner's injury occurred in the "twilight zone," and ... recovery for it "through
workmen's compensation proceedings," could have been, and in fact was, validly
"provided by State law." .. .2
Underlying the Supreme Court's disposition of the case may have been the
assumption that the situation presented here was an aberrational one with the
result that the decision would have no repercussions upon any other branches
of admiralty law. The Court may have simply felt that with an employer who
elects to be sued rather than pay a fixed sum and an employee who prefers to
27 See

GmmtoRE & BLACK, Tnx LAW OF ADusmwrv 347 (1957).

248 The twilight zone doctrine has limited application. It has been confined to situations

where the choice is between the state and federal compensation plan. It has not been recognized in cases where the plaintiff must choose between the Longshoremen's Compensation
Act and the Jones Act or FELA. Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 334 U.S. 344 (1953); Desper
v. Starved Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187 (1952); Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565 (1944);
Nogueira v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 281 U.S. 128 (1930); cf. Rodes, Workmen's Compensation for Maritime Employees: Obscurity in the Twilight Zone, 68 HARV. L. Rv. 637, 650-54
(1955); GirmoRE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADuInuALTY 355 (1957).
249358 U.S. 272 (1959).
250 ORE. REv. STAT. § 656.024 (1957).
251
Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 214 Ore. 1, 320 P.2d 668 (1958). See Chappell
v. C. D. Johnson Lumber Corp., 112 F. Supp. 625 (D. Ore. 1953), rev'd on other grounds
216 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1954), for a similar holding.
212358 U.S. at 273. Mr. justice Stewart, joined by Mr. justice Harlan, dissented, arguing
that the federal act did not permit suits by employees in state courts. The status of the damage
action in Oregon, although ostensibly a question of Oregon state law, is more properly the
question of whether the federal act permits such a suit. It is thus a question upon which the
Supreme Court was not bound to obey the opinion of the Oregon Supreme Court.
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sue rather than take a fixed sum there is no harm done in permitting such a
suit to occur. On the other hand, the employer in the Hahn case may not be
the only employer in the country who both employs maritime workers and
elects not to belong to a state compensation plan for economic reasons. If so,
it may be that the Supreme Court arrived at its decision according to considerations of policy, as it had done in the Davis case.
The policies generating the twilight zone in Davis were obvious as well as
explicit however, while whatever policies controlled the outcome in Hahn were
not articulated. But consideration of the nature of workmen's compensation
may give some indication of the rationale of the Hahn decision.
Approximately two-thirds of the state compensation acts in the country are
voluntary plans permitting employers to choose liability at law instead of compensation.253 The defenses of assumption of risk, fellow servant, and contributory negligence are usually abolished if compensation is rejected, in order to
4
persuade employers to take the compensation plan.
While the average employer generally finds it wiser to prefer the compensation program, the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court would put the waterfront employer in a different situation. Such an employer is faced with paying
two compensation premiums under the federal and the state plans. While he
cannot reject the federal compensation system,2 the state system is optional.
The employer can thus safely reject the state plan, not pay state compensation
premiums and not have to worry about being sued in the state courts since the
Oregon Supreme Court opinion would bar such an action.
Under such conditions, the waterfront employer in Oregon and other states
257
with elective compensation plans is unlikely to accept state compensation.
Although these employers would still have to subscribe to the federal compensation plan, the clear desire of Congress in enacting the Federal Longshoremen's
23

See 2 LAxsoN, WoaxssN's ComPsNSATIoN LAW § 67.10 (1952).

24

See 1 LAusoN, Wo2nmN's

COmimNSATION LAW

§ 5.20 (1952).

2- Apparently, the main reason that the plans are not compulsory is due to early doubts
by the legislatures of the constitutionality of such plans. See 1 LARsoN,-op. cit. supraat § 5.20.
2 Section 938(a) of the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act
makes it a misdemeanor for an employer to fail to secure coverage for compensation with
penalties of a maximum fine of $1000 or a maximum prison term of one year or both.
2 The assumption that the employer must pay two compensation premiums is perhaps
the strongest argument for the existence of the twilight zone. See Note, Workmen's Compensation for MaritimeEmployees: The Jensen Doctrine Re-examined, 10 U. Cai. L. R v. 339, 344

(1943); Rodes, Workmen's Compensation for Maritime Employees: Obscurity in the Twilight

Zone, 68 IAv. L. REv. 637, 650-54 (1955). In such circumstances, it should be a matter of
indifference to the employer which board pays his employee. Where the choice is not between
two compensation plans, but a compensation plan on one side and a jury trial on the other
(as for Jones Act or FELA cases), the inequity of applying twilight zone concepts is obvious.
Here the employer has no choice of accepting or rejecting a compensation plan. Unlike the
situation in the Hahn case, allowing the employee an action at law can have no beneficial
effect in terms of coercing employers to subscribe to any compensation plans.
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and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act was to enable state compensation
plans to operate wherever constitutionally possible.us The logic of the Oregon
Supreme Court would have impeded this policy, and reversal by the United
States Supreme Court thus preserved one of the initial purposes of the Longshoremen's Compensation Act. 59
258 See Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Report on the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's
Compensation Act, S.REP. 973, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 62 CoNG. REc. 7754 (1922); Davis v.
Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 254 (1942); Nogueira v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 281
U.S. 128, 136 (1930); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 39-41 (1932); Nogueira v. New York,
N.H. & H. RR., 281 U.S. 128, 136 (1930); GiLMoRE & BLACK, ThE LAW Or ADMRALTY 245
(1957). The legislative history of the Longshoremen's Act begins with the decision of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) holding New York's compensation act constitutionally inapplicable to maritime situations. Congress thereupon made two attempts to
amend the Savings to Suitors Clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1949) to permit state compensation
plans to apply to admiralty situations but both were held unconstitutional as unwarranted
delegations of Congressional power and as destructive of the uniformity of admiralty law
established by the Constitution State of Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219
(1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). Since the Supreme Court had
indicated in the Dawson case that the existence of a national compensation was the prerequisite
to constitutionally permissible state compensation plans in maritime law, Congress thus enacted the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, establishing a system of federal compensation, but one to be applied only when state workmen's compensation proceedings
could not validly apply. The federal act was upheld against constitutional attacks in Crowell v.
Benson, supra.
29 The federal act has a provision similar to the Oregon Compensation Act, that an employer failing to secure federal compensation coverage becomes liable at law to his employee
without regard to the defenses of assumption of risk, fellow servant and contributory negligence available. 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1952). Since this coercive clause, used to further federal
compensation, is given effect under the federal statute, the argument is strengthened that the
similar Oregon clause must be enforced if the policy is to extend state compensation coverage.

